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Introduction
Every election year, the issue of the death penalty comes to the forefront of
American political discourse. Each candidate feels compelled to explain
and to justify his or her stance on whether or not his or her state, or the
United States as a whole, should employ the death penalty as a means of
criminal punishment. Candidates who support the death penalty use
intimidating crime statistics to increase the fear and frustration in the
hearts of voters. They assure the voters that capital punishment acts as a
deterrent, thereby reducing the incidence of violent crime. They focus on
the characteristics of crime in the United States, the reality of over-crowded
prisons, the fact that felons are released on parole after serving mere frac-
tions of their original sentences, and the recidivism rates for violent
criminals.' Those candidates who believe that the United States should
1. The 1994 New York gubernatorial campaign between Mario Cuomo and George
Pataki vividly illustrates how capital punishment has become one of the most influential
and divisive campaign issues during recent election years. Throughout his three terms
as Governor of New York, Mario Cuomo maintained a firm stance against the death
penalty on both moral and practical grounds. How the Candidates for Statewide Offices
See Major Issues on Election Eve, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 6, 1994, § 13WC, at 12. During the
1994 campaign, Governor Cuomo vehemently criticized plans for reestablishing the
death penalty in New York, calling the death penalty "an abomination, especially for this
state-the last great voice for civility." Ian Fisher, Clamor Over Death Penalty Dominates
Debate on Crime, N.Y. Tmns, Oct. 9, 1994, at 45. Noting poll data which showed that
New York residents were not content with current crime statistics and that a majority
believed the death penalty was the appropriate punishment for murder, George Pataki
made reintroduction of the death penalty one of his primary campaign platforms. Id.
Although some poll data indicated that over 70% of New York voters opposed Cuomo on
the death penalty, other polls demonstrated that the public was more closely divided on
the question of whether the death penalty is more appropriate than life sentences with-
out chance for parole. John Riley, Cuomo Urges Death Penalty Vote; Calls for Legislation
to Set Up Referendum, NEWSDAY, July 8, 1994, at A21. Pataki repeatedly criticized
Cuomo for standing in the way of death penalty legislation. Id.
The death penalty remained a controversial issue up to the final hours of the cam-
paign. Pataki held frequent news conferences and rallies on the death penalty to
increase support for his candidacy. For example, in late October, Pataki held a press
conference at a Long Island Railroad station near where Richard Moran murdered six
people. Jim Dwyer, Pataki Forgets Grieving Guests, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 1994, at A2. Just a
few days before the election, Pataki held a campaign event at the Staten Island house
where Thomas Grasso, best known for Cuomo's refusal to extradite him to Oklahoma
for execution, murdered an 81 year old woman in 1991. Pataki used this opportunity to
return the campaign's focus to the issue of crime after having dealt with divisions within
the Republican Party. Kevin Sack, Pataki, Backing Executions, Assails Cuomo at Murder
Site, N.Y. TrAms, Nov. 5, 1994, at 1. Pataki dramatically stated: "There is no site that
more indicates and is more symptomatic of how Mario Cuomo's policies and Mario
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abolish the death penalty argue that empirical studies indicate that the use
of the death penalty in the United States fails to have the desired deterrent
effect.2 Some opponents of capital punishment argue that its use actually
encourages murder, rather than deterring it.3 Opponents of capital pun-
ishment also argue that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. 4
Cuomo's views are out of touch with the needs and desires of the people of this state."
Id. at 28. Whether or not New York voters elected George Pataki solely based on the
crime issue, capital punishment was undeniably a crucial issue in Pataki's campaign.
2. In 1978, a panel established by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, com-
prised of criminologists, statisticians, political scientists, economists and other experts,
found that "the current evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is inade-
quate for drawing any substantive conclusions." Amsry INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE
STATE KILLS: THE DATH PENALTY: A HumAN RIGHTS IssUE 13 (1989) [hereinafter WHEN
THE STATE KIu.S]. More recently, U.S. criminologists Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins suggested that if the use of capital punishment actually deters homicide to a
greater degree than imprisonment, such an effect would be seen in the empirical studies
that have been conducted. See FRANKnIN E. ZImRING & GORDON HAWINS, CAPrrAL PUN-
ISHMENT AND THE AMEmCAN AGENDA (1986). In their view, the debate over deterrent effect
is "only about whether the marginal deterrent effect is nil or very small in relation to
total homicide volume." Id. at 180-81. But see Frank Carrington, Inconclusive Evidence
Does Not Invalidate Deterrence, in THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (David L.
Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1986) (supporting the deterrence rationale). When assess-
ing the strength of the deterrence rationale, one must be careful when using empirical
studies of the deterrent effect in other countries. This data is potentially misleading
since the effect of capital punishment depends partially on the nature of the political
system as a whole (e.g., dictatorship, military-controlled, theocracy, oligarchy, etc.). If
citizens are not guaranteed the same kinds of protections as are contained in the U.S.
Bill of Rights, and the citizens live in constant fear of repression, then the successful
deterrence of crime cannot be solely attributed to the use of the death penalty. Regard-
less, American voters continue to believe that the death penalty deters violent crime. In
December 1994, the New York Times reported that 57% of New York State registered
voters believe that the death penalty deters criminals from committing murder. Anne
Cronin, Execution and Murder: Looking Hard at America's Deadly Numbers Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, § 4, at 1. However, on the same day, the New York Times reported
that comparing murder rate statistics from 1973 to 1993 of states which use the death
penalty and those which do not does not support the deterrent rationale. Tom Kuntz,
Killings, Legal and Otherwise, Around the U.S., N.Y. TnEs, Dec. 4, 1994, § 4, at 3.
3. Louis Joylon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: OPPOSING VIEwPomrs 102 (David L. Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1986). Dr. West
explains that criminals who are likely to receive the death penalty are more likely to kill
in order to avoid being apprehended. This is a particularly strong argument against
employing the death penalty for crimes other than murder. MIcHAEL KRONENwErTER,
CAPrrAL PUNIsHmENT: A RaEFEENCE HANDBOOK 23 (1993).
4. One of the most eloquent arguments against the constitutionally of the death
penalty is found injustice Thurgood Marshall's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 314-371 (1972). In the conclusion of his opinion, Marshall explains:
At a time in our history when the streets of the Nation's cities inspire fear and
despair, rather than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain objectivity and
concern for our fellow citizens. But, the measure of a country's greatness is its
ability to retain compassion in a time of crisis .... In striking down capital
punishment, this Court does not malign our system of government. On the con-
trary, to pays homage to it. Only in a free society could right triumph in diffi-
cult times, and could civilization record its magnificent advancement. In
recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest
tribute. We achieve 'a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism' and
join the.., other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for
civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.
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Although this debate may appear to be primarily a domestic concern,
other countries around the world are also grappling with the question of
whether or not to employ capital punishment. Nearly 100 countries and
territories currently employ the death penalty.5 However, many others
have abolished the practice completely.6 Some have abolished the death
penalty for all but exceptional crimes, 7 and even more have de facto abol-
ished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, as they have not executed any-
one in at least ten years.8 U.S. citizens can learn much about their own
system and whether retention makes the most sense by studying the
choices made by other countries.9
This Note focuses primarily on the general procedural issues of discre-
tion in the application of the death penalty around the world and the legal-
ity of the exercise of this discretion.10 Part I begins with a general
discussion of the international use of the death penalty and international
attitudes towards its continued use. It demonstrates that the United States
is only one of the many countries which continue to employ capital pun-
ishment, although in the last fifty years the international movement
towards abolition of the death penalty has gained significant momentum.
Parts II-JV analyze the legality, scope and character of discretionary power
in the application of the death penalty around the world. Part II specifi-
cally examines the use of the death penalty in the United States. Part III
discusses capital punishment and. discretion in India. Despite its very dif-
Id. at 371. This has consistently been a minority position, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly refused to make capital sentencing per se unconstitutional. See, e.g., Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (allowing states to admit "victim impact evidence"
as part of the sentencing process).
5. There are 93 countries and territories which retain the death penalty for ordi-
nary crimes. Most of these countries have carried out executions during the past 10
years. See infra note 30.
6. As of early 1996, 56 countries do not provide for the death penalty for any
crime. See infra note 37.
7. This category includes crimes under military law or crimes committed in excep-
tional circumstances such as wartime. Currently there are 15 countries in this category.
See infra note 35.
8. Currently, there are 30 countries and territories in this category. In many cases,
these countries have not employed the death penalty for significantly longer than 10
years. See infra note 38.
9. Amnesty International argues that when one nation employs capital punish-
ment, it becomes easier for other nations to use the death penalty with an appearance of
legitimacy for almost any reason. WHEN THE STATE K.Lus, supra note 2, at 5. The reverse(when one nation's abolition of capital punishment makes it more difficult for other
nations not to abolish its use) has not been true where the United States is concerned.
10. This Note does not analyze all aspects of discretion. A thorough investigation of
the existence, scope, and legality of discretion as applied in the United States and glob-
ally is beyond the scope of this Note. In addition, this Note does not discuss the moral
acceptability of, or justifications for, the use of capital punishment. The death penalty
debate involves many integrated issues and problems; consequently, it is impossible to
isolate completely a single issue without touching on many other issues. Some impor-
tant issues that have received considerable attention include: racial discrimination and
the death penalty, the execution of minors, the execution of pregnant women and new
mothers, the execution of the mentally ill, execution as a means of political repression,
and the morality of capital punishment.
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ferent political history, culture, and religious heritage, the Indian Govern-
ment's use of the death penalty is strikingly similar to its use in the United
States. Part IV addresses the use of the death penalty and discretion in the
Philippines, a country that had been moving towards abolition but recently
reintroduced the death penalty. Even though the Filipino Constitution is
the only one of the three examined in this Note which explicitly addresses
capital punishment and actually abolishes its use except in extreme cir-
cumstances, the current government has used it in the most extreme man-
ner by designating some offenses as mandatory death penalty crimes.
Thus, in the Philippines, individuals who are convicted of these designated
crimes will be executed without regard to any of the unique circumstances
leading to the particular crime.
A comparative study of the legality and use of capital punishment
throughout the world helps one to understand the current international
attitude towards the death penalty, to predict the role capital punishment
might play in the future, and to assess the likelihood of an international
standard calling for the eventual worldwide abolition of capital punish-
ment. For those who are primarily concerned about the future of the
domestic use of capital punishment, a comparative study can help demon-
strate how other nations have dealt with similar problems. Most impor-
tantly, a comparative study of discretion in death sentencing throughout
the world can help retentionist nations construct a system which avoids
arbitrariness, inconsistency, and unfairness to capital defendants..
I. International Trends and Attitudes Regarding Capital Punishment
A. Why Compare the Use of the Death Penalty Around the World?
There are many lessons to be learned by analyzing the use of the death
penalty within the United States in the larger context of worldwide atti-
tudes towards capital punishment. At the same time that the United
Nations General Assembly considered a draft resolution advocating world-
wide abolition of capital punishment,1 ' the use of the death penalty within
the United States expanded.12 How can both the United States and the rest
11. See infra part I.C.2.
12. On March 7, 1995, New York's Governor Pataki signed death penalty legislation
making New York the 38th state authorizing capital punishment. See James Dao, Death
Penalty in New York is Restored After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served- A Vow Fulfilled,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al. This new law took effect September 1, 1995. See Jan
Hoffman, Prepare for New York's Death Penalty, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 31, 1995, at Al. New
York has not executed any prisoners since 1963. AmNES INTEENATIONAL, UNrrE STATES
oF AM uCA: THE DEATH PEmATY 194 (1987). Other states, such as Connecticut and
New Jersey, which have had legislation authorizing the death penalty but have not exe-
cuted any criminals in many years, are expected to start using the death penalty. Stepha-
nie Saul, Executioner's Wait: New York Deaths May Be A Long Way Off, NEWSDAY, Dec. 27,
1994, at A06. Although both states currently have convicts on death row (Connecticut
has five and New Jersey has nine), neither New Jersey nor Connecticut has executed
anyone since each state enacted death penalty legislation, in 1982 and 1980 respec-
tively. Id. However, in April 1995, the Connecticut legislature passed a new death pen-
alty bill designed to make it "significantly easier for juries to impose the death penalty
and the state to carry it out." Kirk Johnson, Connecticut Death Penalty Bills Would Ease
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of the world be correct? Since it appears that the death penalty is a fixture
in countries like the United States, India, and the Philippines, it is crucial
that discretion in death sentencing is channeled in order to avoid arbitrari-
ness, inconsistency, and unfairness to the defendants.
Although the statistics indicating the number of countries which have
abolished capital punishment and which retain its use are informative in
themselves, 13 it is important to note that of the countries and territories
which retain capital punishment, the United States and Japan are the only
"westernized" nations which allow its use.14 Why have these two nations
retained the death penalty while other modem nations have taken affirma-
tive steps to abolish its use? Why do the United States and Japan ignore
the seemingly international trend towards abolition?' 5
Since there is no single international standard regarding the use of
capital punishment, crucial issues arise when criminals accused or even
convicted of crimes in death penalty retentionist nations flee to abolitionist
nations.' 6 Several countries which have abolished the death penalty, at
least in part, have enacted laws imposing restrictions or safeguards on
extradition in cases involving possible death penalties.' 7 These restric-
the Way to Executions, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 10, 1995, at Al. Experts predict that executions
are likely to resume in Connecticut in the near future. Id. In addition, in May 1995,
Pennsylvania executed its first prisoner in 33 years. Pennsylvania Executes First Since '62,
N.Y. Tu, s, May 3, 1995, at A21. This trend is not limited to the states, as the federal
government has also indicated that it intends to resume executions. Federal Government
Set to Resume Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, at A26. Although officials had
planned on executing a prisoner in 1995, the federal government has not executed any
prisoners as of the date of publication.
13. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
14. AmNEr INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY: LisT OF ABoLtmomsr AND RarEN-
-ONISr CouNTRus 5 (Dec. 1995). See also WHEN THE STATE Kna.s, supra note 2, and
KRoNENwExR, supra note 3, at 15.
15. For a discussion of the current use of capital punishment in Japan, see Nicholas
D. Kristof, Death Penalty Popular in Japan, but Rare Recently, N.Y. TimEs, May 19, 1995, at
2. In the United States, 1995 witnessed the largest number of executions since 1957 and
experts suspect that there will be an even larger number of executions in 1996. Fifty-six
Executions This Year Are Most Since 1957, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 30, 1995, at 28. See also infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
16. For instance, can an abolitionist country be compelled to extradite a suspect or
formally charged defendant to a retentionist country for a crime which may result in
capital punishment? See John Pak, Note, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty:
Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 Comm INT'L LJ. 239, 240 (1993) (analyz-
ing the Canadian Supreme Court's 1991 decision to confirm the unconditioned extradi-
tion of two American fugitives to the United States likely to face capital punishment
upon their return). In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights considered the issue
of extradition by signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights. Soering v.
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (holding that the United Kingdom
could not extradite a prisoner to the United States to face charges on a capital offense
because it would violate its responsibilities under the European Convention of Human
Rights); Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United States, Eur. PAu.. Doc. (COM
389) 4 (1992) (reiterating its rejection of the death penalty, calling for its worldwide
abolition, and mandating affirmative actions communicating its opposition to capital
punishment to the United States).
17. These countries include Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. WHEN THE STATE Kias, supra note 2, at 85. The Italian legislature
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tions then are incorporated in extradition treaties between the abolitionist
and retentionist countries. 18 Thus, even when a crime is committed within
a retentionist country and the trial and sentencing would typically depend
only on its domestic law, if a suspect flees to an abolitionist country, the
matter can become a question of international law.
During the last twenty years, the abolition of capital punishment has
become an issue of international law as multi-national organizations and
individual countries have established conventions and treaties designed to
create an international standard against the use of capital punishment. 19
Although the United Nations has not yet advocated world-wide abolition of
capital punishment, in December 1984, the General Assembly established
safeguards protecting the rights of those facing the death penalty.20 Addi-
tionally, at the close of 1994, the General Assembly considered a draft res-
olution calling for an international ban on capital punishment by the year
2000.21 Thus, an international inquiry into the use of the death penalty is
not merely a comparative study of the laws of various nations but also a
study of public international law.
For retentionist countries and territories, one of the most crucial
issues is determining who has the discretion to decide which prisoners
shall live and which shall die. At what stage in the process is this decision
has not enacted such a law, but the Constitutional Court has found extradition to a
death penalty retentionist nation to be a constitutional violation. Id.
18. For example, Article IX of the most recent extradition treaty between the United
States and Italy enables Italy, an abolitionist country, to refuse to extradite to the United
States someone accused of an offense in the United States if that person could possibly
be executed for the alleged offense. Specifically, Article IX states:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting Party and the laws of the requested Party do not
provide for such punishment for that offense, extradition shall be refused unless
the requesting Party provides such assurances as the requested Party considers
sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not
be executed.
Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. IX, T.I.A.S. No.
10,837, at 9.
19. These treaties and conventions include the American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1 (entered into force July
18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention] (limiting the use of capital punishment
and establishing that signatory nations which have abolished the death penalty cannot
reinstate it); Protocol No. 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Nov. 4, 1950,
E.T.S. 114 [hereinafter Protocol No. 6] (created by the member states of the Council of
Europe for the purpose of abolishing the death penalty in signatory nations); Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (1990) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol]. For a
more thorough list of treaties, conventions, and other texts establishing international
standards on both the use and the abolition of the death penalty, see WHna Tim STATE
K.Ls, supra note 2, at 241-57.
20. G.A. Res. 39/118, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
39/118 (1984). See infra part I.C.
21. Weekend Edition: U.N. Resolution Calls for Abolition of Death Penalty (National
Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 27, 1994).
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actually made and by what legal authority is this discretion permitted?
This issue is by no means simple. For example, in the United States there
is no single individual or institutional body entrusted with sole discretion
over which convicted criminals will be given the death sentence for their
crime(s), nor is there any single instance during the criminal justice pro-
cess when such discretion is exercised.22
B. International Use of the Death Penalty
For millennia, the death penalty has been used around the world as a
means of preventing and punishing crime.23 Some anthropologists attest
to finding prehistoric cave drawings which depict executions. 24 Legal ref-
erences to capital punishment can be traced back to 1750 B.C. with the
Code of Hammurabi. 25 Both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible are
replete with references to the use of death as the penalty for various
crimes.26 Perhaps one of the most notorious executions by a state of a
perceived criminal was the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.27 Subhash Gupta,
Deputy Secretary of the Indian Red Cross Society, speculated that "[t]here
is practically no country in the world where the death penalty has never
existed."28
Even though the arguable historical trend has been towards the aboli-
tion of capital punishment,29 ninety-three nations and territories still use it
22. See infra part I.A.
23. For a more thorough chronicle of the history of capital punishment, see WILLAM
A. ScHABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1993). See
also JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1960); JAN GoREca, CAPITAL
PuNIsHMENT." CImINAL. LAw AND SocIAL EVOLUTION 29-95 (1983).
24. ScHABs, supra note 23, at 2-7.
25. Id. Hammurabi was the King of Babylonia from 1792-1750 B.C. THE COLUMBIA
ENcYcLoPEnIA 1184 (Barbara A. Chernow & George A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed. 1993). His
Code, known as one of the greatest of all ancient codes, addressed issues including
business, family relations, labor, private property, personal injury, and punishment. Id.
Although the code is generally humanitarian, its retributive attitude towards punish-
ment is noteworthy. Id.
26. See, e.g., Exodus 21:14 (prescribing death as punishment for murder); Exodus
22:18 (prescribing death as penalty for witchcraft); Leviticus 24:14-23 (stoning pre-
scribed for blasphemy and murder); Deuteronomy 22:21-26 (stoning prescribed for adul-
tery and rape); Esther 7:10, 8:7, 9:25 (Haman, who had plotted against the Jews, was
sentenced by King Ahasu-e'rus and hanged for his crimes); Matthew 14:10-11, (John the
Baptist was beheaded by King Herod); Matthew 27:38 (two robbers were crucified beside
Jesus for their crimes).
27. See Matthew 27:26; Mark 15:15; Luke 23:14-25;John 19:6-10. Not only do these
passages show that capital punishment was used, but they also illustrate who had the
power to choose whom would be subject to the punishment. John 19:10 (Prior to pass-
ing judgment on Jesus, Pilate explains that he has "the power to release [him], and the
power to crucify [him].").
28. SUalIASH C. GuPTA, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT IN INDIA 17 (1986).
29. In 1945 there were only "a handful of abolitionist states;" however, in 1994 over
50 countries have entirely abolished the death penalty. SCuaBAs, supra note 23, at 2. See
also infra note 37. Approximately two countries abolish the death penalty each year.
This trend suggests that it is possible that "by the year 2000, the majority of the states in
this world will have abolished the death penalty, at least in time of peace." William A.
Schabas, International Law and the Death Penalty (on file with author). See also WHEN
THE STATE KILIS, supra note 2, at 1. The current pace of abolition is the fastest in history.
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as a punishment for ordinary crimes with some degree of regularity. 30
Although the methods of execution, the crimes subject to the punishment,
and the rationales supporting its use differ substantially,31 the govern-,
ments, and perhaps even the citizens, of each of these nations have con-
cluded that the death penalty is a legitimate method of criminal
punishment.32 Despite the many differences, one common factor is that
most executions performed by the state, under the designation of capital
punishment, are not carried out in secret.33 In fact, executions often are
announced in advance, reported by the press after they have occurred, and
in many cases, witnessed.34 Fifteen countries have abolished the use of the
Antonio Marchesi, The Death Penalty in Wartime: Arguments for Abolition, in REPORT ON
THE DEAm PnALTY IN WARTnE 1 (Amnesty International, Jan. 1994).
30. Amnesty International's latest information shows that 93 countries and territo-
ries retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The majority of these coun-
tries and territories are known to have executed people during the last decade. The
retentionist countries and territories include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Bar-
buda, Armenia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of
China, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgys-
tan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauri-
tania, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Quatar, Russia,
Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Ara-
bia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tadzhikistan, Taiwan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugosla-
via (Federal Republic of), Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. AMNEsrY INTERNATiONAL, supra note
14, at 5. See also WHEN THE STATE KuLs, supra note 2. Although Ukraine is currently
included in this list, Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk has pledged to abolish the death
penalty within three years. Two Nations Join Panel for Rights in Europe, N.Y. TimEs, Nov.
10, 1995, at A12. Mr. Marchuk has placed a moratorium on executions currently pend-
ing. Id.
31. Although this Note does not explore the different methods of execution, it is
interesting to note that in addition to the methods commonly used in the United States
(hanging, electrocution, poisonous gas and lethal injection) other nations and territories
carry out death sentences through shooting (by either a single executioner or by a firing
squad), beheading, stoning, and even pushing the victim off of a cliff. WHEN THE STATE
K.s, supra note 2, at 54-61.
32. It is not necessarily true that the general public in each of these countries or
territories supports the use of capital punishment. However, one can infer that in those
countries or territories which have representative governments, rather than dictator-
ships, theocracies, or oligarchies, the public supports the use of the death penalty.
33. WHEN THE STATE Kuiis, supra note 2, at 4. Japan is an exception to this general
rule. Executions in Japan are not announced either before or after they occur. Id. at
158. In addition, the Japanese press does not report executions. Id. The authorities do
not even confirm the names of those who have been executed, although they occasion-
ally release statistics on the number of executions during a particular period. Id. The
condemned prisoner is notified of his execution the day before, provided he is suffi-
ciently stable, otherwise he is not told. Id.
34. WHEN THE STATE Ka.S, supra note 2, at 4. Although executions in the United
States are not currently public, many people are in favor of televising executions. RAN.
iALL COYNE & LYN ENTzERoTH, CAPrAL PumsiMENTr AND THEJUDICIAL PRocEss 6 (1994).
Advocates of this position argue that televising executions will have a greater deterrent
effect on violent crime. See generally Leigh B. Bienen, A Good Murder, 20 FoRDaHA URB.
.J. 585 (1993).
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death penalty for ordinary crimes, yet retain it for exceptional crimes, such
as crimes under military law or crimes committed under exceptional cir-
cumstances such as during wartime.35 Antonio Marchesi noted that many
countries reach total abolition in two stages, where the first stage is aboli-
tion for ordinary crimes.36
On the side of total abolition, fifty-six countries have abolished
entirely the use of the death penalty for any crime by repealing all laws that
had authorized such punishment.37 An additional thirty countries and ter-
ritories are considered to be de facto abolitionist since they have not exe-
cuted anyone for over ten years, although they still have laws providing for
the death penalty for ordinary crimes.3 8 Although most of the latter group
of countries have not executed anyone in the last twenty years, they should
not yet be viewed collectively as truly abolitionist in spirit. So long as the
death penalty is still technically legal, the governments may attempt to acti-
vate it.
For example, in late 1993 the Philippine Congress passed legislation
reinstating the death penalty for thirteen heinous crimes.39 While there
had not been an execution in the Philippines since 1976, death sentences
were still imposed until late 1986.40 In 1986, the Constitution of the Phil-
ippines was redrafted and the death penalty was abolished for all crimes
except those which were considered to be heinous.41 In April 1987, Presi-
dent Corazon Aquino announced that she would commute all of the
existing death sentences to life imprisonment.42 But after this notable
trend towards abolition, the Philippines is expected to resume executions
35. These "semi-retentionist" countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus,
El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Seychelles, South Africa,
United Kingdom. The majority of these countries have not executed anyone in over 30
years. AmNEsTY INTmNATIONAL, supra note 14, at 3.
36. Marchesi, supra note 29, at 1. Whereas abolition for ordinary crimes Is often not
a lengthy process, the second stage, total abolition, can be significantly lengthy. For
example, Austria took 18 years to reach total abolition after having elected partial aboli-
tion. Id. Denmark took 45 years, Finland took 23 years, the Netherlands took 112 years,
New Zealand took 28 years, Norway took 74 years, Portugal took 110 years, and Sweden
took 51 years. Id.
37. These countries include: Andora, Angola, Australia, Austria, Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Equador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia
(the former Republic of Yugoslavia), Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Monaco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solo-
mon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican City State,
Venezuela. AMNEmS INrmAxioNAL, supra note 14, at 2.
38. These countries and territories include: Albania, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Comoros, C6te
D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Moldavia, Nauru, Niger, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa (Western), Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname,
Togo, Tonga, Turkey. Id. at 4.
39. REutuc AcT No. 7659, Dec. 13, 1993. See infra part IV.B.
40. WHEN aHE STATE KuLLs, supra note 2, at 191.
41. PHuL Co ST. art. IlI, § 19. See infra part IV.B.
42. Wm TaHE STATE KiLs, supra note 2, at 191-92.
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at any time. This case study illustrates that one must be careful not to
generalize about defacto abolitionist countries and must consider the par-
ticular history of both the legality and the application of the death penalty
in each country when assessing the status of capital punishment in that
country. 43
Many countries have limited application of the death penalty to only
those convicted of murder. According to Amnesty International, twenty-
five of the sixty-three nations known to have executed criminals from the
middle of 1985 to the middle of 1988 executed only convicted- murder-
ers. 44 The United States falls into this category. 45 However, a majority of
the retentionist nations continue to execute people for offenses not result-
ing in the loss of life or even involving violence. 46 For example, Ainesty
International reports that during the last decade prisoners have been exe-
cuted for
adultery (Iran, Saudi Arabia), prostitution (Iran), running a brothel and
showing pornographic films (China), taking bribes (USSR), embezzlement
(China, Ghana, Somalia) ... economic corruption (Iraq) ... kidnapping
(China, Malaysia), rape (China, Egypt, South Africa, Syria, Thailand, Tuni-
sia, United Arab Emirates), robbery or armed robbery (China, Ghana, Iran,
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, Tunisia,
43. Belgium is an example of a country in this category that most closely resembles
the true abolitionist stance. Although Belgium has failed to repeal its death penalty
laws, no executions have occurred since August 1950. Id. at 107. In addition, Belgium
has become a signatory party to both Protocol No. 6, supra note 19, and the Second
Optional Protocol, supra note 19. Consequently, it is now fair to categorize Belgium as
an abolitionist nation despite the legislation still on the books.
44. WHEN THE STATE KilLS, supra note 2, at.37.
45. Those states which authorize the use of capital punishment can only apply it to
those who have been convicted of homicide. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL,
CiumrNAL PRocEDURE § 26.1, at 1088 (2d ed. 1992); WHEN THE STATE KaLLs, supra note 2,
at 227. Since 1972, the Supreme Court has upheld death sentences only for criminal
homicide. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. I n.2 (1980). In 1977,
the Supreme Court held that the death penalty as punishment for non-homicidal rape is
unconstitutional, as it violates the Eighth Amendment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977). Justice White explained that "the Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the
crime committed." Id. at 592. The Supreme Court's test for excessive punishment con-
siders whether the punishment "(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion with the severity of
the crime." Id. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The clear implication of today's holding appears to be that the death penalty
may be properly imposed only as to crimes resulting in death of the victim.
This casts serious doubt upon the constitutional validity of statutes imposing
the death penalty for a variety of conduct which, though dangerous, may not
necessarily result in any immediate death, e.g., treason, airplane hijacking, and
kidnapping.
Id. at 621 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Not all cases of homicide are capital crimes. Gil-
lers, supra, at 2 n.2. For example, in California in order to be subject to the death pen-
alty, a defendant must be found guilty of murder in the first degree, and one of 19
specifically enumerated special circumstances must be found. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2
(West 1995).
46. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 2, at 37.
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Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Zaire, Zambia) and drug-trafficking (China,
Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Thailand).4 7
While this data may surprise most Americans, 48 recent American debate
over the death penalty has raised questions of whether the death penalty
should be extended to crimes other than murder.4 9 International experi-
ence with the use of capital punishment for other crimes can serve as a
source of information for the justification and effect of applying the death
penalty to crimes other than murder.
C. International Standards for the Death Penalty
Although the death penalty has been used throughout the world for centu-
ries, the concept of an international standard for the death penalty is rela-
tively new.50 In the past, whether a country chose to resort to capital
punishment was solely a domestic concern. According to Professor
Schabas, professor at the University of Quebec at Montreal and author of
The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, one of the most
comprehensive analyses of the treatment of capital punishment in public
international law, "[i]nternational norms addressing the limitation and the
abolition of the death penalty are essentially a post-Second World War phe-
nomenon."5 ' The brutality of that war had a profound effect on those who
were working towards building new international organizations designed
to maintain peace among the nations of the world.5 2 In 1948, the General
Assembly of the newly-created United Nations proclaimed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "as a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations" for the "observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms."53 The drafters of the proclamation considered promot-
ing abolition of the death penalty as a goal for civilized nations;54 however,
the final declaration made no reference to capital punishment and only
47. Id. Since the publication of this Amnesty International report, the Philippines
has joined several of these lists. See supra note 39.
48. See supra note 45.
49. See, e.g., Death Penalty: Hearings on S. 32 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
50. This Note presents a mere skeleton of some of the important international trea-
ties and conventions addressing the legal status of the death penalty. For a thorough
presentation and analysis of the trend towards confronting the issue of capital punish-
ment as a matter of international law, see Scu,&As, supra note 23.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. See also WHEN THE STATE KiLLs, supra note 2, at 1.
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Although this
international agreement is not binding, it has been labeled "[t]he cornerstone of contem-
porary human rights law." ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 25. Amnesty International
believes that capital punishment cannot be separated from the broader category of
human rights; consequently, the Universal Declaration and its pledge to observe human
rights, including the right to life, requires total abolition of the death penalty. According
to Amnesty International, continued use of the death penalty violates the pledge. WHEN
THE STATE KILLs, supra note 2, at 1.
54. ScHAs, supra note 23, at 1, 25-27.
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explicitly recognized the "right to life."55 During the drafting process, dele-
gates from the United States and the United Kingdom submitted proposals
urging that the death penalty should be viewed as an exception to the right
to life, as it is in the United States with respect to the constitutionality of
capital punishment.56 Nevertheless, these delegates, joined by others,
including the Soviet delegate, argued that the United Nations should not
signify any approval of the use of capital punishment.57 Even though the
drafters refrained from addressing capital punishment in this initial decla-
ration, the notion of abolishing the death penalty was not abandoned.58
1. Efforts by the United Nations Towards the Worldwide Abolition of
Capital Punishment
Throughout the years following the Universal Declaration, the United
Nations and other international organizations continued shaping the scope
and dimensions of international human rights.59 In the hopes of reaching
a unified international standard, these organizations regularly discussed
how capital punishment should be treated.60 Although the Drafting Com-
mittee of the Commission of Human Rights discussed and crafted potential
international covenants as early as 1947, it took nearly twenty years for the
United Nations to adopt an international standard guiding the use of the
death penalty. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, reiterates the inherent
55. Article 3 states, "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."
Universal Declaration, supra note 53, art. 3. Professor Schabas explains that although
unequivocal abolition of the death penalty garnered considerable support among the
delegates drafting the Universal Declaration, advocates were unable to convince the
majority. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 26-27. Fears of isolating nations which continued
to use capital punishmeit led to the ultimate cautious language. Id. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the drafting by the Commission on Human Rights and subsequently by the
Third Committee of the General Assembly, see id. at 30-45. See also John Humphrey,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: It's History, Impact and Judicial Character, in
HuNA RIGHTs: THmrTY YEARs AFr m-H UumvusAL DEct.LARnoN (Martinus Niijhoff ed.,
1984).
56. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 33-34. Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the delegates
representing the United States and a drafter of the Universal Declaration. Id.
57. Id.
58. Professor Schabas posits that the Universal Declaration was aimed at the ulti-
mate abolition of the death penalty. Id. at 50. In support of this proposition he relies on
the fact that article 3 has "retained its pertinence during the evolution of more compre-
hensive abolitionist norms over subsequent decades." Id.
59. One of the primary objectives of the United Nations is reaffirming "faith in fun-
damental human rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human person." U.N.
CHARTm pmbl. To that end, among the purposes of the United Nations is that of
"achiev[ing] international co-operation in solving international problems of economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHaR-m art. 1, 5 3. The General Assembly is responsi-
ble for initiating studies and making recommendations for the aforementioned purpose.
U.N. CHAum art. 13, 11 1(b). Chapter IX of the Charter sets forth the specific goals and
responsibilities of the United Nations and its members in working towards international
economic and social cooperation. U.N. CHARTm arts. 55-60.
60. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 50.
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right to life declared fundamental in the Universal Declaration, protects
against arbitrary deprivations of this right, seeks to restrict the exercise of
capital punishment in those countries which continue to use it, and
encourages the ultimate abolition of capital punishment.6 1 Unlike the Uni-
versal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is binding on all nations which become party to it.62 While the United
States ratified the Covenant in 1992,63 it made a reservation as to Article
6.64 This Covenant is the first affirmative indication that the United
Nations approves of, if not advocates, an abolitionist position regarding the
death penalty. 65
In December 1984, the General Assembly, building upon the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, passed a resolution which established
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states in relevant part:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be pro-
tected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious of crimes in accordance with the law
in force at the time of the commission of the crime .... This punishment can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood
that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Cove-
nant to derogate.., from any obligation assumed under the... Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation may be granted in all
cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
Id.
62. By 1993, 115 countries had ratified the Covenant and two had signed it. Sonia
Rosen & Stephen Journey, Abolition of the Death Penalty: An Emerging Norm of Interna-
tional Law, 14 H IunmJ. PuB. L. & POLICY 163, 164 (1993).
63. A NEmSY INTE rN ATNAL, AmNET INTEm AoNAL REPORT 1994, at 348 (1994).
64. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General at 132, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.E/11, U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.11 (1993). Professor Schabas explains that the
use of reservations is well recognized in international human rights law, as it allows
states to ratify human rights treaties and covenants even though they cannot be held
accountable for all of the provisions of the treaty or covenant. Id. at 9. Allowing reserva-
tions to international treaties encourages some degree of international cooperation and
fosters continued discussion over the more controversial measures. Id. By making these
reservations, the United States has indicated its continued reluctance to view the "right
to life" as requiring abandonment of the death penalty. Eleven nations have opposed the
U.S. reservations, insisting that they are not permissible because they are incompatible
with the Covenant's purpose. Id.
65. Professor Schabas argues that the repetition of the word "abolition" in article 6
indicates that the covenant contemplates eventual abolition. ScH ASs, supra note 23, at
53. This position allowed retentionist nations to become party to the covenant without
first having to abolish capital punishment. Id. This was important since the covenant
was meant to affect far more than just capital punishment. For a detailed description of
the drafting of this covenant and the process by which it was ultimately adopted by the
full General Assembly, see id. at 53-135.
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further measures, designed to protect the rights of those facing capital pun-
ishment around the world. The "Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the
Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty" enumerates the essential restric-
tions and safeguards on the exercise of capital punishment.6 6 Although
Amnesty International scholars believe that the provisions of this resolu-
tion represent restatements of the protections guaranteed under the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights,67 these safeguards are significantly more
specific and provide greater protection to those subject to capital punish-
ment.68 Even though the United Nations still has not adopted an abolition-
ist posture towards world-wide use of the death penalty, the new
safeguards send an unambiguous message to retentionist nations that
international organizations recognize capital punishment as a ripe area for
human rights abuses and the need for it to be regulated and monitored.
At the close of 1989, the U.N. General Assembly took affirmative steps
towards establishing an international standard advocating the world-wide
abolition of the death penalty by adopting the Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at the Aboli-
66. G.A. Res. 39/118, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
39/119 (1984) [hereinafter Safeguards].
67. WHEN aHE STATE Kn.s, supra note 2, at 35.
68. The resolution states in relevant part:
1. In countries which have not yet abolished the death penalty, capital punish-
ment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being understood that
their scope should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or extremely
grave consequences.
2. Capital punishment may be imposed only for a crime for which the death
penalty is prescribed by law at the time of its commission, it being understood
that if, subsequent to the commission of the crime, provision is made by law for
the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
3. Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime
shall not be sentenced to death, nor shall the death penalty be carried out on
pregnant women, or on new mothers or persons who have become insane.
4. Capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt of the person
charged is based upon clear and convincing evidence leaving no room for an
alternative explanation of the facts.
5. Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all possible safe-
guards to ensure a fair trial... including the right of anyone suspected of or
charged with a crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate
legal assistance at all stages of the proceeding.
6. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to an appeal to a court of
highest jurisdiction, and steps shall be taken to ensure that such appeals shall
become mandatory.
7. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon, or commuta-
tion of sentence; pardon or commutation of sentence may be granted in all cases
of capital punishment.
8. Capital punishment shall not be carried out pending any appeal or other
recourse procedure or other proceeding relating to pardon or commutation of
the sentence.
9. Where capital punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict the
minimum possible suffering.
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tion of the Death Penalty.6 9 The preamble to the Protocol explicitly indi-
cates the signatories' objective of attaining an international commitment to
abolish the death penalty, asserting that "abolition of the death penalty
contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive develop-
ment of human rights... [and] that all measures of abolition of the death
penalty should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to
life."70 Even though this protocol is optional, it unequivocally voices its
opposition to the continued use of capital punishment.71 In addition,
unlike other international agreements, the Second Optional Protocol
explicitly states that, as a general rule, signatory parties may not ratify the
treaty or become signatory parties while also making reservations to it.7 2
This international instrument is open to any member of the United Nations
who previously signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.73 Although the United States ratified the Covenant in 1993, the
United States made a reservation to Article 6 dealing with the right to life
and the use of capital punishment.74 Because the United States may not
make a similar reservation to the Optional Protocol, it is unlikely that it
will ratify the supplemental treaty in the near future.
Safeguards, supra note 66.
69. Second Optional Protocol, supra note 19, pmbl. This protocol is a supplement to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See supra note 61 for article 6
of the International Covenant (pertaining to capital punishment). Traditionally, proto-
cols were commonly regarded as the record of an agreement which is less formal than a
treaty or convention. ERNEST SAToW, A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 339 (1962). Pro-
tocols may be either an independent agreement or a supplement to a convention drawn
up by the same negotiators explaining or interpreting the provisions of the convention.
JAMES R. Fox, DIc-noNARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIvE LAw 356 (1992). Protocols
are frequently used to amend multilateral international agreements, to prolong their
existence, or to qualify their meaning. SATOW, supra, at 339. Since it is an optional
protocol, all those nations which have signed or ratified the original covenant are not
automatically bound to the supplementary protocol. Id. This enables a greater number
of parties to be bound to the covenant as a whole. If a supplementary protocol was not
optional, it is fair to assume that most retentionist nations probably would not remain
signatories to the original covenant.
70. Second Optional Protocol, supra note 19, pmbl.
71. Article 1 of the Second Optional Protocol states:
1. No one within the jurisdiction of a State party to the present Optional Proto-
col shall be executed.
2. Each State party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death pen-
alty within its jurisdiction.
Second Optional Protocol, supra note 19, art. 1.
72. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states in relevant part:
1. No reservation is admissible to the present protocol, except for a reservation
made at the time of ratification or accession that provides for the application of
the death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious
crime of a military nature committed during wartime.
2. The State party making such a reservation shall at the time of ratification or
accession communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the rele-
vant provisions of its national legislation applicable during wartime.
Id. For an explanation of how parties make reservations yet still ratify international
agreements, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
73. Second Optional Protocol, supra note 19, art. 7. See supra note 61 for the rele-
vant death penalty provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
74. See supra note 61.
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2. Recent Efforts by the United Nations
In the final months of 1994, the General Assembly considered a draft reso-
lution calling for "a world-wide ban on capital punishment by the year
2000."7 5 After active debates, several proposed drafts, no-action motions,
and amendments, the General Assembly's Social, Humanitarian and Cul-
tural Committee ultimately rejected the resolution.76 The high number of
death sentences imposed and executions carried out around the world
motivated the original support of the draft resolution.7 7 The proponents of
the resolution believed that retentionist nations should amend their legisla-
tion to ensure full respect for the right to life. 78 They did not accept the
position that the death penalty is an exception to the right to life. In addi-
tion, they believed that evidence suggesting capital punishment serves as a
deterrent to future crime was unconvincing.79
The proposed draft resolution attempted to place a world-wide mora-
torium on executions.8 0 To give effect to this resolution, the draft invited
all nations which had not signed existing human rights treaties directed at
the abolition of the death penalty to do so.81 Germany's representative to
the United Nations, Christian Mook, explaining the resolution's objective,
stated that "[w]hat is involved is the human quality of everybody, even
somebody who is an assassin. Of course we don't want to condone any
murder or any heinous act, but human beings should never be the object of
state's actions and especially not the object of retaliation or revenge."8 2
Another fundamental objective of the draft resolution was to urge those
countries which continue to use the death penalty to "exclude pregnant
women and juveniles from capital executions."8 3 Human rights organiza-
tions and abolitionist nations take firm positions that such executions dra-
75. See Weekend Edition, supra note 21. General Assembly draft resolutions, like
Security Council resolutions, are not binding on U.N. members. Consequently, these
pronouncements are intended to indicate the relative positions of the Member States.
U.N. Postpones Vote on Death Penalty, UPI, Dec. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File. Nevertheless, if this draft resolution had been passed and supported
by an overwhelming majority of the Member States, it would have sent an affirmative
message to those countries who continue to use the death penalty that they too should
abolish its use.
76. Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Panel Defeats Resolution on Capital Punishment, Reuters
Word Service, Dec. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
77. Weekend Edition, supra note 21. Italy, Ireland and Germany led the abolitionist
movement in the United Nations, and throughout most of the debates, they were joined
by approximately 50 other nations. Id. See also U.N. Postpones Vote on Death Penalty,
supra note 75. After an amendment sponsored by Singapore was added to the draft
resolution, see infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text, approximately 40 states,
mostly from Europe and Latin America, continued to support the draft resolution. Der-
win Pereira, Singapore Opposed Draft As It Was 'Wrong and One-Sided," THE S-Rarrs Tnmis
(Singapore), Dec. 12, 1994, at 1.
78. Weekend Edition, supra note 21.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. U.N. Rejects Move to End Death Penalty, UPI, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI file.
82. Weekend Edition, supra note 21.
83. U.N. Rejects Move to End Death Penalty, supra note 81.
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matically violate fundamental human rights.8 4 Although the draft
resolution itself would not have been binding, international treaties per-
taining to civil and political rights and the rights of children nevertheless
would have been used to enforce the ban on executions of pregnant women
and children.85
Opponents of the resolution, led by Singapore and numerous Islamic
countries,8 6 sought to defeat the draft resolution on two grounds. First,
Singapore's representative argued that because there was no clear consen-
sus on the issue of capital punishment and because the death penalty had
become such a divisive issue, the General Assembly should not enact a
draft resolution condemning its continued use.8 7 On the day that the Gen-
eral Assembly's Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee was sched-
uled to take action on the draft resolution, Singapore, supported by Algeria,
Bangladesh, and Egypt, proposed a no-action motion aimed at forestalling
a vote on the resolution by the committee and ultimately the full General
Assembly.88 Although the motion was defeated by a comfortable major-
ity,8 9 the Committee decided to postpone action so that opponents to the
draft could propose amendments and all Members could consult with their
governments regarding both the draft resolution and suggested
amendments. 90
The draft resolution opponents' second major objection was embodied
in an amendment introduced by Singapore. 91 This amendment, which a
majority of the Committee members voted to include in the draft resolu-
tion,92 explicitly recognized the "sovereign rights of states to determine the
legal measures and penalties which are appropriate in their societies to
combat serious crimes effectively." 93 Singapore's Permanent Representa-
tive to the United Nations, Chew Tai Soo, explained that the resolution was
overly one-sided, as it "ignored the plight of countless victims of murder-
ers, drug traffickers and other serious criminals."9 4 In his view, decisions
of criminal justice constitute an essential part of the sovereign right of all
nations.95 Although he said that he respects the decisions of other govern-
ments to abolish the death penalty in their own nations, Chew Tai Soo
firmly believes that nations should not force their values and systems of
84. WHN' THE STATE KLs, supra note 2, at 38-40.
85. Leopold, supra note 76.
86. U.N. Rejects Move to End Death Penalty, supra note 81,
87. Leopold, supra note 76.
88. United Nations Package: Wednesday Highlights, Federal News Service, Dec. 8,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File.
89. Id. Sixty-five nations supported the motion, while 74 voted against it, and
another 20 abstained. Id.
90. U.N. Postpones Vote on Death Penalty, supra note 75.
91. U.N. Rejects Move to End Death Penalty, supra note 81.
92. Leopold, supra note 76. Seventy-one nations voted to adopt the amendment,
while 65 nations voted against it, and 21 nations abstained. Id.
93. Pereira, supra note 77. In addition, the amendment deleted references to interna-
tional law in all but one provision. Leopold, supra note 76.
94. Pereira, supra note 77.
95. Id.
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justice on others. 96 He explained that "what works in other countries need
not work in Singapore, and vice-versa." 97 China's representative, Wang
Xuexian, took a more belligerent position against the original draft resolu-
tion, suggesting that it was another example of wealthy nations imposing
their own values on developing nations.9 8
The draft resolution lost substantial support once Singapore's amend-
ment was adopted. All of the resolution's original sponsors withdrew their
sponsorship, and several of them abstained from the final vote, as they
were unwilling to support the amendment.9 9 The Social, Humanitarian
and Cultural Committee defeated the draft resolution by a vote of forty-
four to thirty-six, with seventy-four nations abstaining.1 0 0 At present, it is
unclear whether this defeat will have a significant effect in discouraging the
United Nations from taking an affirmative role in the abolitionist move-
ment in the near future. Nevertheless, the large number of abstentions
from the final vote may signify that there is significant support for future
resolutions.
3. Efforts by Other International Organizations
The United Nations was not the only international organization to work
towards establishing an international standard against the continued use
of capital punishment during the years following World War I. In 1978,
the American Convention on Human Rights became the first international
treaty to take an unequivocal abolitionist stand on the use of the death
penalty. 10 1 Article 4 of the treaty, entitled "Right to Life," specifically
addresses capital punishment and delineates the international standards to
which the parties agreed to adhere. 10 2 Unlike other U.N. treaties, this
treaty established restrictive rules on the use of the death penalty instead
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Leopold, supra note 76.
99. Id. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Spain all withdrew their sponsor-
ship and abstained from the vote while Italy and Ireland withdrew their sponsorship but
did vote on the final resolution. Id.
100. Leopold, supra note 76. The United States voted against the resolution; however,
the United States voted against the Singapore Amendment. Id.
101. American Convention, supra note 19. Although similar provisions are included
in the United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the
General Assembly's resolution establishing Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the
Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, this treaty predates each of them. See supra
notes 61, 68 and accompanying text.
102. Article 4 states in relevant part:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment,
enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such punish-
ment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply.
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in the states that have abol-
ished it.
Cornell International Law Journal
of merely advocating heightened respect for life and suggesting eventual
abolition of the death penalty. It was particularly innovative in forbidding
capital punishment for political offenses or related common crimes and
forbidding the execution of individuals under the age of eighteen, individu-
als over the age of seventy, and pregnant women.103 This treaty was also
the first to limit the exercise of the death penalty to only "the most serious
crimes," in those countries that have not abolished its use and to forbid the
extension of capital punishment to new crimes. As of January 11, 1988,
twenty countries had ratified the Convention. 104 Although the United
States was an initial signatory, the U.S. Congress never ratified it.105
In February 1985, European nations took an even greater step towards
an international standard promoting the abolition of the death penalty
when they became parties to Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concern-
ing the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 10 6 The European Convention on
Human Rights, 10 7 which Protocol No. 6 supplements, was signed on
November 4, 1950, and entered into force on September 3, 1953.108 Arti-
cle 2 of the European Convention recognizes capital punishment as an
exception to the right to life, and it does not include the limitations and
safeguards governing the use of capital punishment in retentionist nations
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or
related common crimes.
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the
crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor
shall it be applied to pregnant women.
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital
punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by
the competent authority.
American Convention, supra note 19, art. 4.
103. Id.
104. RcHARD B. LimcH, INrERNATioNAL HuMAN RIGHTS INsTRumENTs: A COMPILATION
OF TREA'Ts, AGREEMENTS AND DEcLARATIONS OF ESPECIAL INTRESr To THE UNITED STATES
190.26 (1983). These countries include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
105. See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
106. Protocol No. 6, supra note 19. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland were the
first signatories to this Protocol. All of the European nations signed the treaty on April
28, 1983. ScuwaAs, supra note 23, at 237-38. Later in 1983, Greece and Italy became
signatories. Id. at 238. Iceland, Finland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino signed in 1989.
Id. In 1990, Hungary became a signatory party, the first of the former Eastern Bloc
nations to do so. Id. In 1991, Czechoslovakia and Malta became signatories. Id.
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Greece are the only signatory parties which have yet to
ratify the Protocol. Id. Although they are signatory parties to the European Convention,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Turkey have not signed Protocol No. 6. Id. For a
more thorough description of the European Convention and the drafting of Protocol No.
6, see id. at 211-38.
107. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
1955, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
108. Id.
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that are found in subsequent international treaties.10 9 Nevertheless, the
European Convention served as a model for the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human
Rights.110 Because nearly all of Western Europe had become, at least in
practice, abolitionist for ordinary crimes including murder, the Council of
Europe recognized the need to take a more affirmative stance against the
continued use of capital punishment."1
The preamble to Protocol No. 6 indicates that the motivation behind
this addition to the European Convention on Human Rights was the recog-
nition that several Member States of the Council of Europe had exper-
ienced an evolution which "expresses a general tendency in favour of
abolition of the death penalty."112 Article 1 explicitly states that "[t]he
death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such pen-
alty or executed."1 13 Complete abolition under all circumstances is not
advocated, because the framers of the protocol permitted signatory nations
to maintain laws allowing imposition of death sentences for acts commit-
ted in time of war or during a time of imminent threat of war. 114 Those
countries which ratify and/or become signatory parties to Protocol No. 6
may not make reservations as to any of its provisions, 115 which is also the
case with the U.N. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. 1 6 As of February 1, 1993, nineteen nations
had ratified Protocol No. 6.117 Some scholars have gone so far as to say
that "for all intents and purposes, we can speak of Europe as being an
abolitionist continent.""18
109. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 212. See supra notes 61, 68, and 104 and accompany-
ing text. Article 2 of the European Convention states in relevant part:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
a. in defence [sic] of any person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained;
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
European Convention, supra note 107, art. 2. Turkey is the only country which is a
signatory to the Convention and continues to use the death penalty. ScHAIAS, supra note
23, at 213. For a more thorough discussion of Turkey's current use of capital punish-
ment, see infra note 118.
110. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 212. See supra notes 61 and 104 and accompanying
text for discussion of these treaties.
111. Scu &s, supra note 23, at 211-12.
112. Protocol No. 6, supra note 19, pmbl.
113. Id. art. 1.
114. Id. art. 2.
115. Id. art. 4.
116. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
117. ScHABAs, supra note 23, at 323.
118. Schabas, supra note 29, at 2-3. Turkey is the only country in Western Europe
that continues to use the death penalty for all crimes. ROGER HOOD, Tim DEARH PamrALY:
Cornell International Law Journal
The evolution of international standards towards the abolition of capi-
tal punishment demonstrates that the issue of whether the death penalty
should continue to be used is not only an important domestic concern for
nations all over the world, but it has become an important consideration in
public international law. In order to adequately assess whether retention
of capital punishment is the correct course for one's own country, one
must consider international trends both in individual countries and collec-
tively in international organizations. It is inappropriate to focus on spe-
cific aspects of or problems with the death penalty without recognizing the
broader context of world wide use and acceptance of capital punishment.
More specifically, it is wrong to focus immediately on the details of discre-
tionary power and the death penalty in those countries which retain the
practice without noting the growing international trend towards the aboli-
tion of the death penalty on human rights grounds.
II. Discretion in the United States
A. Constitutional Treatment of the Death Penalty in General
In the United States, much of the decision of whether someone will receive
the death penalty is made outside of the courtroom. Capital proceedings
involve a complex process where many groups and individuals have the
responsibility of determining who will live or die.119 Actors in both the
A WORLD-WIDE PERSPEcrrvE 9 (1989). Although there had not been any executions in
Turkey since 1984, the Turkish Parliamentary Judicial Commission approved a death
sentence in November 1993. If the Turkish Parliament ever ratifies this sentence, the
execution would likely occur within days. Memorandum from the Amnesty Interna-
tional Themes Team and Research Team to the Death Penalty Coordinators, Turkey:
Death Penalty Action Circular (June 24, 1994) (on file with author). In March 1994, eight
Kurdish members of the Turkish Parliament were arrested and charged with offenses
which by law could have resulted in the death penalty. Id. However, at a hearing on
November 24, 1994, the state security court dropped the charges and announced that
the eight men would be charged for different offenses carrying sentences resulting in
varying prison terms. Court Changes Tack to Lift Death Penalty Threat to Kurdish MPs,
Agence France Presse, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File. At
the close of 1995, Turkey still had not carried out any executions. Even though the
Turkish courts continue to impose death sentences on particular criminals, commenta-
tors suggest that such sentences are routinely reduced to life sentences. Turkish Court
Sentences Leftist Rebels to Death, RaurEs WORLD SERvicE, Dec. 19, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l News Service File.
The United Kingdom provides for capital punishment for a few exceptional crimes
committed by members of the armed forces during wartime, such as treason and espio-
nage. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 2, at 226. Nevertheless, there has not been an
execution in the United Kingdom since 1964. Id. In accordance with Protocol 6, some
signatory parties have laws which allow them to reintroduce capital punishment in times
of war or imminent threat of war. ScuiAas, supra note 23, at 324. For example, articles
5 and 27 of Switzerland's Military Criminal Code allow for the use of the death penalty
"in time of war or imminent threat of war, within the meaning of article 2 of Protocol No.
6." Id. The Swiss government may also use the death penalty during wartime on
grounds of necessity according to legislation passed by the Federal Council. Id.
119. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNErH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DATH PENALTY
10-18 (1987). Nakell and Hardy illustrate the major discretionary stages of the capital
punishment process using a flow chart. Id. at 12-13.
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legislative and judicial processes play roles in deciding whether to impose
a death sentence.
The legislature decides when it determines who is eligible for the
death penalty by specifying which crimes warrant the death penalty, which
special circumstances must be identified before the prosecutor may ask for
the death penalty, and which aggravating circumstances and mitigating
factors must be considered by the sentencing jury. 20 The prosecutor
120. In the United States, trials for capital murder are usually bifurcated. In the first
stage, the suspect's guilt or innocence is determined. If the suspect is found guilty, a
separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or a term of imprisonment. Professor Sundby explained the
rationale of a bifurcated trial:
Splitting the decision-making process into two distinct stages allows the Court
to justify treating aggravating and mitigating factors differently by maintaining
that they address distinct aspects of the sentencer's decision .... [The guilt]
stage enhances reliability by ensuring that the sentencer has considered all rele-
vant factors pertaining to the individual's culpability and character before mak-
ing its "reasoned moral response."
Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Miti-
gation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1164 (1991). Thejury at the second
proceeding is usually, but not necessarily, the same jury that decided on the defendant's
guilt. For example, current Texas death penalty legislation provides:
If a defendant is tried for a capital offense in which the state seeks the death
penalty, on a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding
shall be conducted in the trial court and, except as provided by Article 44.29(c)
of this code, before the trial jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evi-
dence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to [the]
sentence .... The state and the defendant or the defendant's counsel shall be
permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711 § 3(a) (West 1994). Section 210.6(2) of the
Model Penal Code also requires that a separate proceeding be held "to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced for a felony of the first degree or sentenced
to death." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Professors
LaFave and Israel explain that capital sentencing hearings are highly regulated and
impose significantly more requirements on the parties than non-capital sentencing pro-
ceedings. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. IsRAn, CiuNiA~ L PROcEtuRE § 26.1, at 1088
(2d ed. 1992). Specifically, capital sentencing hearings are subject to
burden of proof requirements similar to those imposed for the offense itself, to
various restrictions regarding the type of evidence that can be introduced with
respect to mitigating and aggravating factors, to special restrictions relating to
the prosecution's argument to the jury and to the judge's charge -to the jury
regarding its sentencing function, to limitations on the process utilized where
the judge has the authority to impose a sentence of death notwithstanding ajury
recommendation of a life sentence, and to special requirements for appellate
review of the death sentence. The end result is a sentencing procedure which is
quite distinct from the typical sentencing procedure and which much more
closely resembles the trial on the issue of guilt.
Id. The rules of procedure governing the conduct of capital cases are determined by
state law, thus they may vary considerably from state to state. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has never held that a capital case must be bifurcated, the Court's hold-
ings in both Furman v. Georgia, infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text, and Gregg v.
Georgia, infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text, require that the death penalty not
be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously and that the sentencing body is "apprised of the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 29
decides when he or she determines whether to prosecute the crime as a
capital offense and whether to offer or accept a plea bargain. 121 The judge
decides with each pre-trial determination she makes and when she rules on
the admissibility of evidence to be considered by the sentencing jury when
it assesses aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 122 The trial jury
decides when it finds the defendant guilty or innocent. The sentencing
jury decides when it selects or rejects the death penalty. The appellate
judges decide when they affirm, reverse, or dismiss a death penalty convic-
tion on appeal, either on direct review or in a habeas corpus action. The
governor decides when he considers, and responds to, a petition for clem-
ency. The Supreme Court decides when it reviews death penalty statutes
in light of the protections provided in the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. Finally, the American public decides when it puts political pres-
sure on prosecutors, legislatures, and governors to seek the death penalty,
to provide for the death penalty, and to ensure that death sentences are
carried out or not.
This multi-phase procedure may be viewed as a beneficial and neces-
sary protection of accused criminals because it provides many opportuni-
ties for the accused to escape the death penalty. However, this process also
can be viewed as problematic, as the many opportunities for discretion can
lead to inconsistent and arbitrary application of the death penalty. This
Note does not analyze each discretionary stage separately or the processes
through which each actor or group makes its decision. Rather, it focuses
on the constitutional limitations and requirements on the exercise of dis-
cretion which have been established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Constitution does not address explicitly the legality or appli-
cation of the death penalty in its text. The possibility of capital punish-
ment, however, is suggested in the opening clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which declares that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury."123 Since the death penalty was recognized as an available
means of punishment at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution
and the Bill of Rights,124 courts traditionally have assumed that capital
its use of the information." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). Justice Stewart,
writing for the plurality in Gregg explained that "[a]s a general proposition these con-
cerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding .... [However,]
each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis." Id. The constitutional
tests established by the court in Gregg and Furman are sufficiently particular such that it
is unlikely that a different system would satisfy the requirements. DAvID PANMcK, JUDI-
cAL Rxviaw oF THE DEATH PENATY 155 (1982).
121. See infra part H.D.
122. For example, whenever a judge rules on a suppression motion, she affects the
defendant's chances of being found guilty for a capital offense. Also, the judge's deter-
minations during voir dire can affect the ultimate determination.
123. U.S. CONsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
124. The European settlers brought capital punishment to the colonies. At that time,
the death penalty was not prescribed by statute, but rather was part of the English com-
mon law. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Auz. L. REv. 143,
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punishment is not prohibited by either the Eighth Amendment 125 or the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 126 The
Supreme Court never has held that capital punishment is per se unconstitu-
tional. In fact, prior to 1968, the Supreme Court did not consider any
cases where the validity of a death sentence was at issue, operating under
the assumption that the death penalty was constitutional. 127 This funda-
mental assumption is best illustrated by Chief Justice Warren's majority
opinion in Trop v. Dulles, in which he wrote:
At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the
constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against
capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing
the purposes of punishment-and they are forceful-the death penalty has
been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely
accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty.128
In this and in other cases, the Court seems reluctant to mitigate its reliance
on the notion that death is a valid mode of punishment under the Constitu-
tion. Even though the Court has played a significantly more active role in
regulating the use of capital punishment during the last twenty-five years
by applying the Eighth Amendment as a limit to state death penalty legisla-
tion,129 there have been only occasional dissenting arguments in favor of
finding the death penalty per se unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. 130
146-47 (1986). By the time of the American Revolution, the common law established a
mandatory death penalty for treason, murder, mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary
and larceny. Id. The British Parliament, at that time, extended the coverage of capital
punishment to over 200 felonies. Id. See also PHium E. MAcumY, VoicEs ACM sr DEATH xi(1976).
125. The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
126. The Fifth Amendments due process clause states that "No person shall... be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause states that "no State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNsr. amend.
XIV, § 1.
127. WELSH S. WHrrE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NnrET Es 4 (1991).
128. 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
129. See infra part II.B.
130. See, e.g., the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 269-306, 360-71 (1972). On February 22, 1994, Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion from the Supreme Court's order denying the review of a Texas death
penalty case, Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994), proclaimed that, after over 20
years of upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, he had concluded that it
was in fact unconstitutional. Linda Greenhouse, Death Penalty is Renounced by Black-
mun, N.Y. TiMS, Feb. 23, 1994, at Al. Blackmun's opinion explained that:
[D]espite the effort of the States and Courts to devise legal formulas and proce-
dural rules to meet this daunting challenge [of consistent, fair, and error-free
determination of whether a person shall live or die], the death penalty remains
fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake .... From this
day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more
than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority
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Because the majority position on the Supreme Court consistently has
been that capital punishment is permissible under the U.S. Constitution,
prior to 1968 the Court left the issue of death penalty legality to the states.
In 1968, however, the Court reversed its traditional approach in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, in which the Court reversed a death sentence after finding
an integral procedure in the state's sentencing process to be invalid.131 For
the first time, the Supreme Court elevated the question of the procedural
application of the death penalty to the constitutional level. 132 Although the
particular issue addressed in this case involved the question of when a trial
court is permitted to exclude jurors and for what reasons it may so
exclude, 133 this case opened the door to further Supreme Court review of
closely related death sentencing procedures. 134 As a practical matter,
Witherspoon had a significant effect on states' criminal procedure, vacating
approximately 150 capital sentences throughout the United States.135
of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more
than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor .... I feel
morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed .... [N]o combination of procedural rules or substantive
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional defi-
ciencies .... The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal and moral
error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a sys-
tem that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death
required by the Constitution .... "[Tihe death penalty ... must be abandoned
altogether."
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Godfres v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). In response to Blackmun's sur-
prise announcement, Justice Scalia's opinion in Callins reiterated the Court's belief that
the death penalty is constitutional. Scalia wrote:
Convictions in opposition to the death penalty are often passionate and deeply
held. That would be no excuse for reading them into a Constitution that does
not contain them, even if they represented the convictions of a majority of Amer-
icans .... If the people conclude that such more brutal deaths may be deterred
by capital punishment; indeed, if they merely conclude that justice requires
such brutal deaths to be avenged by capital punishment; the creation of false,
untextual and unhistorical contradictions within 'the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence' should not prevent them.
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128.
131. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). This case considered whether an Illinois statute that
allowed the prosecution to challenge potential jurors who opposed or merely had consci-
entious scruples against capital punishment for cause in murder trials was constitution-
ally permissible. The Court found that even though the defense did not prove that the
particular jury in this case was biased, "it is self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of the
punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the
petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 518.
132. WELSH S. WHr, LIFE IN THE BALANCE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPrrAL CASES
33 (1984).
133. See supra note 131. The Court held that a potentialjuror cannot be excluded for
cause because of his views on the death penalty "unless (1) his views are unmistakably
clear, and (2) his views would compel him to vote automatically against imposition of
the death penalty or would prevent him from making the required impartial determina-
tion of guilt or innocence." Id. See also WirrE, supra note 132, at 34.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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The impact of Witherspoon soon became obvious when, only three
years later, the Court evaluated death penalty legislation in terms of
whether it satisfied the requirements implicitly included in the U.S. Consti-
tution. The Court considered whether the nearly universal practice of giv-
ing a sentencing jury virtually unlimited discretion in deriving its sentence
was valid under the Eighth Amendment.' 36 This new focus on capital sen-
tencing procedures had a profound effect on the death penalty's constitu-
tional status as the Eighth Amendment began to play a role in limiting how
it was applied. Since 1972, the Court has tried strenuously to craft a work-
able constitutional standard governing state use of the death penalty.
B. Constitutional Treatment of Discretion in Death Sentencing' 37
1. Furman v. Georgia-Protection Against Arbitrary and Inconsistent
Sentencing
Sentencing discretion is one of several death penalty issues on which the
Supreme Court has focused significant attention over the past twenty-five
years.138 Starting in 1972, the Court worked to establish meaningful
136. In 1972, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether "the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute[s] cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Aikens v.
California, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, 403 U.S. 952
(1971). See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
137. The constitutional development of this area of the law involves many cases,
numerous interrelated issues, and many intermediary steps. A thorough investigation of
Eighth Amendment law is beyond the scope of this Note. Justice Scalia summarized the
history of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in his partial
concurrence to Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-64 (1990). For a more detailed
presentation and analysis of the significant issues, see generally Sundby, supra note 120;
Poulos, supra note 124; Sean Fitzgerald, Walking a Constitutional Tightrope: Discretion
Guidance and the Texas Capital Sentencing Scheme, 28 Hous. L. REv. 663 (1991); William
S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from its
Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737 (1985).
138. Another critical issue is race, gender, and the death penalty. See, e.g., Turner v.
Murphy, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Spencer v. Georgia, 500 U.S. 960 (1991) (denial of certio-
rari) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Sheri LynnJohnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CowEmu L. REv. 1016 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HAv. L. REV. 1388 (1988);
Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in
Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STA. L. Rev. 27 (1984); Elizabeth
Rapport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAw & Soc'y Rev. 367
(1991); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homi-
cide Cases, LAw & Soc'Y REv. 587 (1985).
The death penalty and the law of habeas corpus also has received considerable atten-
tion from both the Supreme Court and commentators. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113
S. Ct. 853 (1993) (holding that a showing of innocence does not entitle a petitioner to
habeas relief); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine bars federal habeas review when a state court's
refusal to address petitioner's federal claims is based on a procedural default); Donald
P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Process for a Simple Procedure, 77 MInN. L.
Rrv. 1015 (1993); Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? -A Comment on Recent
Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. Rev. 1665 (1990); Henry
J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L.
Rev. 142 (1970). See generally CoYNE & ENTzmom, supra note 34, at 495-583.
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guidelines for capital sentencing that would satisfy the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' 39 In 1971, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari for four death penalty cases 140 in order
to consider whether "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in [these cases] constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."14 ' In each
case, the sentencing juries had exercised unlimited discretion in deciding
whether to prescribe death or life imprisonment. As Justice Douglas
explained in his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, "[]uries (or judges, as
the case may be) ha[d] particularly untrammeled discretion to let an
accused live or die."142 Such unbridled discretion was not unique to the
three states involved in these cases, but rather had become the general
practice in capital sentencing throughout the country. Nearly all of the
forty-one states whose laws provided for capital punishment conferred
unfettered discretion on the sentencing body.143
The states had no reason to believe that there were constitutional diffi-
culties with such a sentencing scheme. For this reason, the Supreme
Court's holding in Furman v. Georgia'44 came as an enormous surprise,
having the effect of "wiping the constitutional slate clean" and throwing the
law of capital punishment "into a state of flux." 145 In a per curium deci-
sion,146 the Court held that "the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."1 47 Because there was no
majority opinion, the decision had the stunning effect of invalidating the
sentencing schemes of a majority of the states without providing any mean-
ingful guidance as to how the states should rewrite their statutes. At the
same time, the Court's holding removed the death sentences which had
been imposed on approximately 600 prisoners awaiting execution across
the country and changed the course of many capital prosecutions moving
139. Justice Douglas' concurrence in Furman v. Georgia explained that, prior to 1972,
the Supreme Court had consistently assumed that "punishment by death is not cruel,
unless the matter of execution can be said to be inhumane and barbarous." Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972).
140. Aikens v. California, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v.
Texas, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
141. Id.
142. 408 U.S. 238 at 248. In a footnote, Justice Douglas repeated part ofJustice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1970), in which
Justice Brennan criticized current death penalty legislation noting that
capital sentencing procedures.., are purposely constructed to allow the maxi-
mum possible variation from one case to the next, and [that] provide no mecha-
nism to prevent that consciously maximized variation from reflecting merely
random or arbitrary choice.
408 U.S. at 248-49, nl11.
143. Poulos, supra note 124, at 144, 248 (Table 2).
144. 408 U.S. at 238.
145. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1150.
146. The five justices who supported the judgment filed separate opinions, and the
four dissenters filed their own opinions as well. As a result, the opinion is 232 pages
long in the U.S. Supreme Court Reports.
'147. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
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through the judicial process at that time.148 Scholars have called this
result "the legal equivalent of the Big Bang for capital punishment."149
After Furman, if state legislatures wished to continue to use the death pen-
alty they had to draft new legislation which more carefully channeled the
judge or jury's sentencing discretion in order to avoid arbitrariness and
inconsistent sentencing. This proved to be a difficult task as state legisla-
tures were given little guidance.
2. Mandatory Death Sentences
Between 1972 and 1976, state legislatures attempted to draft death penalty
statutes that would pass constitutional muster under the newly yet vaguely
articulated standard. Twenty-two states took the extreme approach of com-
pletely eliminating sentencer discretion and implementing mandatory capi-
tal sentencing for particular crimes.150 Thus, rather than causing state
legislatures to consider whether the death penalty was a suitable sentenc-
ing option, Furman had the opposite effect of causing states to avoid unfet-
tered discretion by imposing inflexible sentencing guidelines. Under such
a statute, if a defendant was found guilty of one of the specifically desig-
nated crimes, he or she would be sentenced to death, without exception.151
Once the trial jury reached its verdict, the particular circumstances of the
case or defendant could not be considered.' 5 2 The legislature had sole
discretion over who would be subject to the death penalty, and so long as
the Supreme Court held that such statutes were constitutional, the judici-
ary was limited greatly in its discretion.' 5 3 With the decision to adopt a
policy of mandatory capital sentencing, state legislatures were required to
categorize capital offenses more carefully. More specifically, legislatures
had to parse carefully the criminal code and change the penalties for anti-
quated crimes or those which would not warrant mandatory death
sentences.' 54 If citizens of a state did not support capital punishment for
148. Id. at 416-17 (Powell J., dissenting).
149. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1152.
150. Poulos, supra note 124, at 199-200. These states included California, Delaware,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
151. Poulos, supra note 124, at 201. For example, post-Furman legislation in Louisi-
ana provided that "Whoever commits the crime of the first degree murder shall be pun-
ished by death." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1986).
152. Poulos, supra note 124, at 201. Although juries were not supposed to consider
any mitigating factors unique to a particular defendant, juries in the guilt phase of capi-
tal trials tended to consider whether or not specific defendants deserved death. Sundby,
supra note 120, at 1172-73. Professor Sundby explains that history demonstrates that
sentencing bodies faced with schemes which allow for zero discretion will consistently
refuse to follow the law. Id. at 1173. This "renegade discretion" will result in inconsis-
tent and arbitrary sentencing as different juries may disagree on whether the evidence
presented warrants a death sentence. Id. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
153. Poulos, supra note 124, at 201. Judges retained some degree of discretion with
respect to rulings on the admissibility of evidence and their influence during jury
selection.
154. Id.
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particular offenses, they had to work within the normal legislative process:
urging their representatives to redefine such offenses and electing someone
else if the representatives refused.
The twelve states that did not respond by drafting mandatory death
sentencing legislation attempted to provide juries with greater guidance in
order to channel their sentencing discretion.15 5 They modeled their legis-
lation on Model Penal Code section 210.6,156 which set forth the circum-
stances under which the death sentence should be excluded. 157 Most
significantly, these statutes delineated which aggravating circumstances
must be found by the jury in order to impose a death sentence and which
mitigating circumstances might call for leniency in sentencing. 158 In addi-
155. Id. at 203-26.
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
157. Section 210.6(1) states in relevant part:
(1) Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder, the
Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is satisfied that:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) of
this section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be estab-
lished if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2) of this Sec-
tion; or
(b) substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at the
trial, call for leniency; or
(c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
approval of the Court, pleaded guilt to murder as a felony of the first degree;
or
(d) the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime; or
(e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not fore-
close all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
Id. Subsection (2) of § 210.6 describes the procedure for capital sentencing, but is too
long to be reproduced here. In particular, it explains that the sentencing phase must be
a separate proceeding from the guilt or innocence phase, what evidence may be
presented during the sentencing proceeding, and the discretionary power held by the
judge and jury. Id. § 210.6(2). This subsection also introduces the concepts of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances. Id.
158. According to § 210.6, the death penalty can only be imposed in cases where the
judge or jury is able to identify at least one of the enumerated aggravating factors. If
none of these factors apply to the specific case at trial, the death penalty is not an avail-
able sentence. Subsection (3) states in relevant part:
(3) Aggravating Circumstances
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the comnission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit a robbery, rape or deviate intercourse
by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
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tion, those statutes which most closely followed the Model Penal Code pro-
vided that death sentencing would be excluded when "the defendant was
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. 159
When Texas was forced to redraft its legislation following Furman, its new
legislation had language which seemed to establish mandatory sentencing.
However, the Texas courts interpreted the legislation as allowing for some
degree of individualized sentencing discretion.160
Perhaps if more of the states had drafted their death penalty legisla-
tion using the Model Penal Code as a guide, the courts, including ulti-
mately the Supreme Court, would not have increased their involvement in
capital sentencing discretion issues. More specifically, the Model Penal
Code version of death penalty legislation strove to achieve a balance
between providing guidance for sentencing juries (which protected against
pre-Furman era arbitrariness and inconsistency), and allowing for discre-
tion in considering factors specific to the particular case and defendant. 161
Mandatory capital sentencing proved to be inflexible and did not eliminate
problems of inconsistency and arbitrariness.162
It did not take long for challenges to mandatory death penalty statutes
to reach the Supreme Court. One argument against mandatory sentencing
is that it does not eliminate sentencer discretion. Sentencers faced with a
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity.
Id. § 210.6(3). The sentencing body is entitled to consider the enumerated mitigating
factors in order to determine whether "circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency." Id. § 210.6(3). Subsection (4) states in relevant part:
(4) Mitigating Circumstances
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect
or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
159. Id. § 201.6(1)(d).
160. Poulos, supra note 124, at 199. This is an example of how the judiciary is able to
construe legislation to protect against inconsistency and arbitrariness. However, it is
clear that such active participation by the judiciary in death sentencing may infringe on
the legislature's role.
161. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1147-56. Professor Sundby has labeled this balance
as being one between "guided discretion" and "individualized consideration." Id- at
1148.
162. Poulos, supra note 124, at 201; Sundby, supra note 120, at 1173.
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perceived impossible moral choice are likely to find indirect ways to get
around such rigid guidelines. Professor Sundby observed that
the history of the mandatory death penalty is that of the sentencer seeking a
means to evade the law's mandate... [w]hether through the development of
legal escape routes ... or through the refusal of the sentencer to follow the
law, discretion has inevitably crept into mandatory death penalty schemes
and has created fissures of uncertainty within the legal framework. 163
This suggests that under such a sentencing regime, trial jurors who
are uncomfortable with applying a death sentence to a particular set of
facts and circumstances may be more likely to find the defendant not
guilty in order to avoid the mandatory sentence.' 64 Although mitigating
evidence would not be brought into the court for sentencing purposes, the
trial jury would be sufficiently familiar with the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the crime and the defendant. Individual jurors would be
unable to avoid considering the penalty when determining guilt or inno-
cence, despite court rules to the contrary.165
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Gregg v. Georgia'66 and Woodson
v. North Carolina167 that mandatory death penalties were invalid under the
Eighth Amendment because they did "not fulfill Furman's basic require-
ment by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective stan-
dards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death."168 The plurality in Woodson rejected
mandatory death penalties explaining that the offender's character, record,
and the circumstances of the particular offense must be considered when-
ever death is considered as a possible punishment.169 Similarly, in its
163. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1170-71.
164. Id. at 1170-74. Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens noted that history supports
this claim. Specifically, they wrote:
At least since the Revolution, American jurors have, with some regularity, disre-
garded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence
was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict .... Nineteenth century jour-
nalists, statesmen, and jurists repeatedly observed that jurors were often
deterred from convicting palpably guilty men of first-degree murder under
mandatory statutes .... The actions of sentencing juries suggest that under
contemporary standards of decency, death is viewed as an inappropriate pun-
ishment for a substantial proportion of convicted first-degree murders. The
belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an
identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which the
death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293-95 (1976).
165. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1170-74.
166. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
167. 428 U.S. at 280.
168. Id. at 303.
169. Id. at 304. Justice Stewart explained that mandatory sentencing
treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be sub-
jected to the blind infliction of death .... We believe that in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . .
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
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majority opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, where the Court upheld Georgia's
capital sentencing statute,170 the same three judges explained that: "[slo
long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the pre-sen-
tence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose
restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information
before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision."1 7 1 Thus,
Woodson and Gregg invalidated a majority of the states' response to
Furman's rejection of unbridled discretion. However, unlike in Furman,
the Court addressed the basic Eighth Amendment parameters for capital
punishment; the sentencer's discretion must be limited in terms of when
the sentence can be imposed, but adequate discretion must remain so that
the sentencing body is able to consider the specific circumstances of the
defendant and the crime for which he or she has been convicted before it
imposes the death sentence. 172
3. Guided Discretion-Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Designed to
Guarantee Both Consistency and Individualized Consideration
The Supreme Court decision in Lockett v. Ohio' 73 further ariiculated the
requirement that sentencing bodies consider the facts of the particular case
when making their sentencing decisions. In this way, the Court broadened
the scope of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Not only did it hold that
individualized sentencing is permissible, but the majority indicated that
individualized sentencing is essential in capital cases. 174 The Court recog-
nized that there is no perfect sentencing procedure capable of guaranteeing
a total absence of arbitrariness and inconsistency. However, allowing a
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensa-
ble part of the process of inflicting the death penalty.
Id.
170. Petitioner challenged the statute claiming that it gave the sentencing body too
much discretion and consequently failed to remove the "elements of arbitrariness and
capriciousness condemned by Furman." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155. The Georgia statute
resembled the Model Penal Code statute, supra notes 156-59, in that the sentencing
authority is required to find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the enumerated aggravat-
ing circumstances. Even if the judge or jury finds such an aggravating circumstance,
they are not obligated to impose the death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65.
171. Id. at 203-04.
172. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1153.
173. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
174. Id. at 604-05. More specifically, the majority stated:
We recognized that, in noncapital cases, the established practice of individual-
ized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but in public policy
enacted into statutes. The considerations that account for the wide acceptance
of individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely cannot be thought
less important in capital cases. Given that the imposition of death by public
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The
need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due
[to] the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital
cases .... The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with
respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.
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judge or jury to consider relevant mitigating factors will protect against
instances where the death penalty is imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty.175
The Court found that the Ohio statute under review in Lockett was
constitutionally inadequate because it failed to permit the individualized
consideration required by the Eighth Amendment.176 Under the Ohio stat-
ute, the sentencing judge or jury was required to impose the death penalty
in the case of aggravated murder unless the sentencer was able to identify
one of three mitigating factors.177 The majority found that "[t]he limited
range of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the sen-
tencer... is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not pre-
clude consideration of relevant mitigating factors." 178
The Court's more recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan179 suggests
that the current Supreme Court may be reconsidering its Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, putting the goal of individualized sentencing in jeop-
ardy. In Harmelin, the Court held that mandatory sentencing of life
without the possibility of parole, without allowing the jury to consider any
mitigating factors, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 180
This decision suggests that the Court is becoming increasingly reluctant to
find mandatory sentences to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment. As Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, explained:
Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our
nation's history .... [Mlandatory death sentences abounded in our first
Penal Code. They were also common in the several States-both at the time
of the founding and throughout the 19th century .... There can be no
serious contention, then, that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and
unusual becomes so simply because it is "mandatory."18 1
Justice Scalia did not explicitly state that he was against individualized sen-
tencing in death penalty cases in this decision;' 8 2 however, he made it
Id
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 607. The enumerated factors included:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of
insanity.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978) (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)
(1975)).
178. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
179. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
180. Id. at 994-96.
181. Id. at 994-95.
182. Justice Scalia's partial concurrence in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656
(1990), more clearly demonstrates his objection to current Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence with respect to the death penalty. In Walton, Scalia explained that Furman's
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clear that the current Court would not extend the protection to sentences of
mandatory life in prison.183 The Court has drawn the constitutional line
at death, due to its irrevocability and its rejection of convict rehabilitation,
and "see[s] no basis for extending [this protection] further."18 4
At the present time, Justice Scalia's desire to overturn Lockett and
thereby significantly limit a judge or sentencing jury's ability to consider
mitigating circumstances has remained a minority position. Nevertheless,
it is unclear whether the Court will continue ardently to protect a convict's
right to introduce mitigating evidence.' 85 After more than two decades of
active Court involvement in regulating the use of the death penalty through
its construction of the Eighth Amendment, the Court may start to retreat
and grant greater discretion to the States. This pattern seems to be incon-
sistent with a growing trend among international organizations of moving
towards total abolition of capital punishment.
C. Executive Clemency as an Essential Final Backstop 186
Virtually every state constitution in the United States confers upon a state
governor the power to commute a death sentence into a sentence of life
objective of "channeling and limiting... the sentencer's discretion in imposing the
death penalty" and Woodson and Lockett's objective of individualized discretion are
incompatible. Id. at 657-66 (quoting Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988)).
He rejected the majority's explanation that the two requirements serve different func-
tions and steadfastly argued that the contradiction must be remedied. Id. at 665. Scalia
further explained that "the Lockett rule represents a sheer 'about face' from Furman, an
outright negation of the principle of guided discretion that brought us down the path of
regulating capital sentencing procedures in the first place." Id. at 667. He warned that
the Court's continued pursuance of these contradicting objections has resulted in signifi-
cant confusion such that "[flor state lawmakers, the lesson has been that a decision of
[the] Court is nearly worthless as a guide for the future; though [they] approve or seem-
ingly even require some sentencing procedure today, [they] may well retroactively pro-
hibit it tomorrow." Id. at 668. Scalia indicated that he does not find mandatory capital
sentencing to be cruel and unusual based on what was usual at the time the Eighth
Amendment was ratified. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 671 (1990). He explained
that:
It is quite immaterial that most States have abandoned the practice of automati-
cally sentencing to death all offenders guilty of a capital crime, in favor of a
separate procedure in which the sentencer is given the opportunity to consider
the appropriateness of death in the individual case... still less is it relevant that
mandatory capital sentencing is (or is alleged to be) out of touch with 'contem-
porary community values' regarding the administration of justice.
Id. at 671-72. Finally, Scalia proposed that the Court overturn both Woodson and Lock-
ett since they are "rationally irreconcilable with Furman." Id. at 672-73. See Sundby,
supra note 120, for a more detailed discussion of Scalia's opposition to Woodson and
Lockett.
183. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996.
184. Id.
185. Sundby, supra note 120, at 1207.
186. Many scholars have written extensively on the subject of executive clemency,
both in general and within the context of the death penalty. For a more in depth
analysis see generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Clemency in Capital Cases, 18
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990-91); Daniel T. Kobil, Do The Paperwork or Die:
Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIo ST. LJ. 655 (1991); Note, Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 136 (1964); Michael B. Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a
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imprisonment; however, governors rarely exercise this power. In the
United States, the concept of clemency includes full pardons, conditional
pardons, commutations to lesser sentences, remission of fines, and
reprieves. 187 Article II of the U.S. Constitution confers upon the President
the "[power] to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States."188 The nature of the American judicial system-in which the judge
and jury are constrained in what they are permitted to hear by statute and
procedural rules-requires some mechanism by which a defendant can
describe his particular case and personal circumstances without
limitation. 18 9
The Constitution does not require that the states enact any clemency
mechanisms. Nevertheless, every state that currently provides for the
death penalty as punishment has constitutional or statutory clemency pro-
visions.190 The good will of the state legislature, procedural rule-makers,
and drafters of the state constitution may be determinative in deciding
whether or not clemency is provided. The Eighth Circuit recently noted
that "[n]o procedural or fundamental constitutional right.., creates a pro-
tected interest in clemency."' 9 1 The Court explained that the concept of
federalism requires such a position.19 2 Thus, a defendant's Fourteenth
Decisional Problem Arising in the Terminal Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHi. KENT L.
REv. 13 (1965); Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE LJ. 889 (1981).
187. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. CL 853, 866 (1993).
188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cd. 1. In 1833, Chief Justice John Marshall noted that
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execu-
tion of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for
whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. It is
a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge see only with judicial
eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case.
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-61 (1833).
189. In general, clemency does not flow merely from the will of the governor, as it did
commonly in Chief Justice Marshall's time. Today, most states have committees or
boards which are entrusted with the power to grant pardons. See generally CoYNE &
ENZEreao, supra note 34, at 644. Each state legislature has discretion in how it chooses
to structure its clemency procedures. Usually, the governor is one of the members of
such committees or boards. For example, in Nebraska the members of the Board of
Pardons include the Governor, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. The
Eighth Circuit in Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (1994), found that the Attorney General
may sit on this board despite the fact that she has a great interest in having the penalty
stand. Nevertheless, in 29 states, clemency power rests solely with the governor. Daniel
T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69
TEx. L. REv. 569, 605 n.232 (1991). Even though many of these states establish advisory
boards to make recommendations to the governor, such recommendations are non-bind-
ing. Sixteen other states require that an administrative panel or board share in clemency
decisionmaking. Id. at 605 n.233. Five states have separated the governor from clem-
ency decision-making by providing that an administrative panel has principal authority.
Id. at 605 n.234.
190. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 867.
191. Otey, 34 F.3d at 637.
192. Id. at 638.
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and Fifth Amendment rights of due process do not include a liberty inter-
est in clemency hearings.
Despite the lack of a constitutional guarantee of state clemency provi-
sions, the Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of clem-
ency. In Herrera v. Collins, the Court indicated that executive clemency is
the "fail safe" mechanism in a fallible judicial system where it is possible
for people to be wrongfully convicted.' 93 The Court also noted that clem-
ency procedures have been exercised when "demonstrations of actual inno-
cence have been made."'194
Although the Supreme Court has encouraged states to provide viable
methods for convicted criminals to apply for clemency verbally, it has
failed to require anything concrete. States have virtually unfettered discre-
tion in constructing clemency procedures. The only real limitations on
state autonomy are guarantees of due process and equal protection which
require that procedures do not "shock the conscience of the reviewing
court"'195 and that the procedures are equally available to all individuals.
Consequently, the liberty interest in clemency proceedings are limited to
whatever the state is willing to allow. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that "when a commutation statute does not impose standards
constraining the discretion of the board as to when clemency must be
granted, the statute does not create a constitutional right or entitlement
sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause."196 Many states merely recog-
nize the right of a convicted defendant to apply for a pardon.' 97 In such
states, the pardoning board has complete discretion in reaching its
decision.' 9 8
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that the availability of clem-
ency proceedings is important, and its respect for state autonomy in defin-
ing the parameters of such proceedings, the Court has created a potentially
serious dilemma for those convicted defendants who obtain new exculpa-
tory evidence after their case has completed direct review. In Herrera v.
Collins, the Supreme Court held that a "claim of actual innocence based on
newly discovered evidence is not ground for habeas relief."19 9 The major-
ity indicated that "the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on
new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has
193. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868.
194. Id.
195. Otey, 34 F.3d at 640 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
196. Id. at 637 (citing Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032, 1034 (1994)).
197. The Nebraska statute analyzed in Otey v. Stenberg merely authorizes the creation
and maintenance of a Board of Pardons, grants certain investigatory powers to the mem-
bers of the Board (Le., powers to issue subpoenas and compel attendance of witnesses),
regulates how applications shall be filed, and guarantees that no death sentence will be
carried out before the Board issues a ruling. Nebraska Treatment and Corrections Act,
NEB. RE V. STAT. §§ 83-170, 83-1127-1134 (1987).
198. There are "no specific criteria which an applicant must meet to earn a commuta-
tion from the Board of Pardons, no conditions which must first be met, no specific
conduct which the applicant must have avoided, [and] no guidelines of any kind which
must be followed by the Board." Otey, 34 F.3d at 637.
199. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 853.
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been executive clemency." 200 Because states are not even required to have
clemency provisions in their statutes or constitutions, such defendants
may never be able to present new evidence. The dissent in Otey v. Stenberg
identified this problem and stated that the "newly recognized and empha-
sized significance of the clemency process illustrates the constitutional
deficiencies in the clemency proceeding."20'
If executive clemency is going to serve as the safeguard measure that
the Supreme Court suggests it should be, there must be some change. The
privilege of executive clemency must have more force than mere Supreme
Court rhetoric, giving it some real teeth. Regarding newly discovered evi-
dence, either federal courts should be able to hear the evidence on habeas
review or state clemency panels should be required to hear the evidence.
This protection would be especially valuable in cases where a defendant
has been found guilty solely on circumstantial evidence. The courts could
use the Due Process Clause to justify either change.
A final problem with the executive clemency privilege in the United
States is that governors are too often influenced by extra-legal pressures to
grant or not grant petitions for clemency.20 2 In an era when a candidate's
position on the death penalty has become a political litmus test,20 3 gover-
nors facing challenging reelection bids often are faced with significant
pressure to refuse petitions for clemency. Rather than focusing on a peti-
tioner's grounds for a pardon, a governor, as well as other elected members
of a panel, cannot help but weigh the political consequences of her deci-
sion.204 Governors often shy away from exercising their power to grant
pardons. The governor may feel that, after the legislature has constructed a
200. Id. at 869.
201. Otey, 34 F.3d at 639.
202. For example, in January 1992, Bill Clinton, who was then Governor of Arkansas
and actively campaigning for the Democratic Party's nomination for the upcoming presi-
dential election, refused Rickey Ray Rector's final petition for clemency. Rector had been
sentenced to death for killing a police officer in 1981. Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168
(Ark. 1983). By late 1991, Rector had virtually exhausted his judicial remedies and the
question of whether he would live or die rested solely with Governor Clinton. Rector's
case was particularly appropriate for clemency since immediately after murdering the
policeman, he unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself in the
forehead. The bullet entered the front part of his brain; consequently, Rector suffered
the equivalent of a frontal lobotomy. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991).
The clinical effect was that although Rector had the appearance of a "mature adult," he
"would have a near-total inability to conceptualize beyond a response to immediate sen-
sations or provocations." Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEw YoRxa, Feb. 22,
1993, at 105, 111. The Arkansas Supreme Court explained that these circumstances
were appropriate for clemency and indicated that the issue "should properly be
addressed to the Governor, who has the facilities for investigating all the facts." Rector,
659 S.W.2d at 175. Unfortunately for Rector, Governor Clinton's campaign was strug-
gling to gain support. Gennifer Flowers had recently alleged that she had had an extra-
marital affair with Clinton, and the Bush campaign was suggesting that Clinton was not
sufficiently tough on crime. Some critics postulate that Clinton needed to demonstrate
that he was strong on crime in order to solidify support, and Rector became that demon-
stration. See Frady, supra, at 107.
203. See supra note 1.
204. Frady, supra note 202, at 113.
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penal statute through the rigors of the democratic process and afterthe
judges and juries, following all of the established procedures, have reached
a guilty verdict and decided on the death sentence, it is undemocratic for
her to intervene.205 However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, execu-
tive clemency is the final check in a process which is known to be fallible.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, "[h]istory is replete with examples of
wrongly convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of after-
discovered evidence establishing their innocence." 206
D. Summary of Discretion in the Use of Capital Punishment in the
United States
In the United States, many different individuals and groups of people pos-
sess varying degrees of discretion in the death sentencing process.20 7 So
long as capital punishment is valid under the U.S. Constitution, state legis-
latures and governors have the ultimate discretion in deciding whether or
not the state will employ the death penalty as a means of punishment,20 8
States do not have to authorize the use of the death penalty just because
capital punishment is constitutional. However, once a state adopts death
penalty legislation, those entrusted with the power to apply such legislation
are limited in the discretion they have in their exercise of this power.209
Prosecutors in jurisdictions which allow for the death penalty as pun-
ishment for particular crimes cannot ask for the death penalty arbitrar-
ily.210 So long as the law is not changed, all future cases which are similar
205. Id.
206. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. CL 853, 868 (1963).
207. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
208. Although the state legislature passes legislation, each governor sets her own leg-
islative agenda, much like the President of the United States, and then works with the
legislature to achieve this agenda. New York's Governor Pataki set death penalty legisla-
tion as one of his legislative priorities for 1995. At a press conferencejust two days after
the election, Governor Pataki reiterated his campaign promise of signing a bill to restore
the death penalty within the next year, making New York the 38th state authorizing
capital punishment. Jan Hoffman, The 1994 Elections: New York State Issues; Law on
Death Penalty is Likely by Next Fall, N.Y. TiEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at B13. The New York
State legislature had passed such legislation 18 times and those bills were vetoed that
many times. Id. On March 7, 1995 Governor Pataki was able to fulfill his promise as he
signed the state legislature's newest death penalty bill into law. See James Dao, Death
Penalty in New York is Restored After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served. A Vow Fulfilled,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al.
Although the attorney general's office does not prosecute violent crimes, New York's
newest Attorney General, Dennis Vacco also indicated that his first priority would be to
ensure that the death penalty was reinstated. Elizabeth Wasserman, Vacco Calls the
Death Penalty a Priority, N.Y. Tumds, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al. He attributed his tight victory
to his reputation and record for being tough on crime from his career as a U.S. attorney
for the Western District of New York. Id. The presence of this new political team in
Albany is sure to result in a far stricter approach to handling crime than New York State
has experienced in recent decades.
209. Death penalty legislation tends to require that a certain number of aggravating
factors be identified in order for a murderer to be eligible for death. See supra part II.B.2-
3.
210. The prosecutor faces a certain degree of political pressure to ask for the death
penalty, particularly when the criminal or the crime is notorious. For example, in cases
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must be treated the same way. Thus, although the prosecutor has some
degreE of choice, her power to chose whether or not to ask for the death
penalty is limited. Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a significant amount of
discretion in her power to offer and accept plea bargain agreements. One
scholar has argued that "plea bargaining in capital cases makes it less
likely that the death penalty will be applied even-handedly or that impos-
ing it will achieve any of the penological goals it was intended to serve."211
Finally, a prosecutor may elect never to seek the death penalty for crimes
where capital punishment is statutorily authorized. Although such a pros-
ecutor is satisfying the constitutional requirement of consistency in terms
of how crimes in her district are prosecuted, such a decision may produce
constitutional problems on the state-wide scale. More specifically, if prose-
cutors in other parts of the state seek the death penalty more aggressively,
then those defendants who are charged with capital crimes may be able to
challenge their sentences on grounds of arbitrariness since they might not
have received a death sentence in other parts of the state.212
where the crime (at least first degree murder) is perceived as being notably atrocious or
heinous and where the accused is unknown or someone with whom people generally are
unable to identify, the public is more likely to urge prosecutors to seek the death pen-
alty. An excellent illustration of the prosecutor's decision making process is the seem-
ingly inconsistent decisions of prosecutors in the OJ. Simpson case in California, where
the death penalty was not requested, and the Susan Smith case in South Carolina (where
a mother drowned her two sons, subsequently claimed that they had been kidnapped,
and nine days later confessed her crime), where the death penalty was sought. Rick
Bragg, The Nation: O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith; Two Crimes, Two Punishments, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, § 4, at 1. Law professors and practicing lawyers have explained
that these decisions are made based on the community's prejudices. Id. In cases where
the public views the accused as "one of us" and the prosecutor has little chance of con-
verting the accused into "one of them, the predators who would destroy [the human
community]," prosecutors tend not to seek the death penalty. Id. The prosecutors have
little chance of destroying OJ. Simpson's image as an American hero. One expert on
capital murder trials explained that in Mr. Simpson's case "it is much more like having a
friend or family member accused of a crime. Susan Smith is defined publicly only by
her crime." Id. In addition, the Los Angeles prosecutors know that insisting on the
death penalty is likely to result in an acquittal as the jury is unlikely to be willing to
convict with death as an option. Id. Susan Smith is more likely to be a victim of polit-
ical pressures. In an era where the public wants more than mere "tough on crime" rheto-
ric, Mrs. Smith's case is an excellent opportunity for local prosecutors to carry out the
promises of the state attorney generals and governors. The day Mrs. Smith was charged
for her crime, a "bloodthirsty crowd" demonstrated outside the courthouse voicing out-
rage and demanding that she be killed in the same manner by which she killed her
children. Id. These contemporary cases suggest that so long as politics and community
prejudice influence the decisions of prosecutors in whether they will seek the death
penalty, the decision of who will live or die will continue to be inconsistent.
211. WEsS S. WrTE, THE DATH PENALTY IN THE NIfEms: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL Pt istmiEr 69 (1991).
212. This problem has recently arisen in New York State. Upon passage of the cur-
rent New York death penalty legislation, the Bronx District Attorney, Robert T. Johnson,
indicated that he would not aggressively seek death sentences. Adam Nossiter, Balking
Prosecutors: A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A27.
Approximately one year later, Mr. Johnson was faced with deciding whether or not to go
through with this assertion, after a New York City police officer was murdered. Jan
Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue of Obligation of Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1996, § 1, at 33. Although Johnson publicly stated that he would consider seeking the
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The sentencing jury's discretion is limited by legislation as well. fol-
lowing the dictates of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the state legislatures attempt to channel the information which the
jurors may consider by specifying categories of potential aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. These sentencing statutes vary significantly
among the states.213 However, the categories of potential mitigating cir-
cumstances designated by the state legislatures tend to be relatively
broad, 214 thereby reintroducing a considerable degree of discretion. In
addition, because many states do not require that jurors explain how they
arrived at their verdict, it is possible that other subjective influences affect
their ultimate verdict. Thus, although the Supreme Court intended that
these post-Furman statutes would guide juror discretion in capital sentenc-
ing, the Court's additional objective of ensuring individualized considera-
tion results in considerable room for arbitrariness and inconsistency. 215
Although the majority of states respect the jury's ultimate decision of
life or death, Alabama, Florida, and Indiana allow trial judges to overrule a
jury and impose a death penalty.216 These states authorize judges to make
such unilateral decisions even if the jury unanimously votes in favor of a
life sentence. 217 In Spaziano v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that this
process of jury override is constitutionally permissible. 218 The Supreme
death penalty in this case, he did not retreat from his anti-death penalty stance. Id.
Fearing that Johnson would exercise his unreviewable discretion to formally reject the
death penalty, Governor Pataki asked him to tell his aides in advance whether or not he
would decide against seeking the death penalty in this case. James Dao, A Killing in the
Bronx: The Governor, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1996, at B1. WhenJohnson refused to com-
ply with this request, Governor Pataki removed Johnson. Id. He was concerned geo-
graphic discrepancies in application of the new death penalty law would result in a
constitutional challenge in the law. Id. The New York Court of Appeals indicated that it
would be willing to review the legislation on "geographic discrimination" grounds.
Nossiter, supra.
213. The capital sentencing statutes of those states that have continued to employ the
death penalty since Furman, Woodson, and Gregg vary with respect to the specificity of
their lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, the Florida statute
is a good example of a very specific statute, designed to produce more consistent sen-
tencing outcomes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1995).
214. For example, juries in Florida are instructed to consider whether:
(a) The defendant has [any] significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person.
() The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.
215. See supra part II.B.3.
216. CoYtE & ENTzERoTH, supra note 34, at 404.
217. Id.
218. 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun explained that:
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Court also has indicated that the U.S. Constitution does not require that a
jury's decision to impose a death sentence be unanimous.219 Thus,
although it is generally true that juries in the United States have a signifi-
cant amount of discretion over the cases that have reached the sentencing
phase, this discretion is already limited by constitutional and legislative
guidelines and may continue to be limited if more states decide to author-
ize jury override and non-unanimous verdicts.
Because so many different groups and individuals play a role in death
sentencing, it is easy for each party to shift the burden of the ultimate deci-
sion to another party. Thus, when a convicted criminal is executed, no one
individual or group feels responsible for the death. Certainly it is easier for
the state to justify the use of capital punishment when no one feels direct
responsibility for the executions. Although the United States death sen-
tencing process, involving many participants and opportunities for discre-
tion, can protect the convicted criminal,220 this ability to shift the ultimate
responsibility of the execution has adverse effects on the criminal. The
participants in the various stages of death penalty prosecutions can avoid
feeling morally responsible for their decisions, which in turn makes it eas-
ier for them to reach a decision to authorize capital punishment.22' Oppo-
nents of the death penalty should underscore this problem and require
that someone take full responsibility for each judicially authorized death.
This personal responsibility may deter some of the participants from
imposing death sentences in the more questionable cases.
Finally, both advocates and opponents of capital punishment in the
United States should look beyond the United States for guidance in their
quest to achieve the most fair and consistent system of capital sentencing.
Many nations have abolished capital punishment. Could this be a direct
response to their inability to strike a workable balance in fairness and con-
sistency in allocating discretion and responsibility among the various
there is certainly nothing in the safeguards necessitated by the Court's recogni-
tion of the qualitative difference of the death penalty that requires that the sen-
tence be imposed by a jury .... The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have
adopted a different practice, however, does not establish that contemporary
standards of decency are offended by the jury override. The Eighth Amendment
is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority
of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.
Id. at 460, 464.
219. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
304 n.1 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
221. More specifically, prosecutors are able to shift the responsibility of a death sen-
tence to the legislature, arguing that they were merely applying the law. The jury can
avoid taking responsibility by arguing that it was merely following the sentencing laws
set forth by statute. The legislature can avoid responsibility by arguing that the legisla-
tion reflected the will of the constituents. The governor can avoid responsibility by argu-
ing that the prosecutors, judges, and juries carefully considered the case and found
death to be an appropriate punishment for the particular case following statutory guide-
lines, and that overturning the sentence would be antidemocratic. This endless loop
makes death sentencing easier since no single group feels personally responsible for the
result.
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groups involved in death penalty litigation? Have other retentioryist
nations found a better way of channeling discretion? What rationales are
given by those nations which completely limit sentencer discretion?
Because there is no indication that the United States will abolish the death
penalty in the near future, it is essential to structure the capital sentencing
system in such a way that arbitrariness and inconsistency are reduced as
much as possible.
III. Discretion in India
That the use of the death penalty in India is strikingly similar to the proce-
dures practiced in the United States is surprising given the different histo-
ries and cultures of the two nations. 222 The fact that the legality and the
use of capital punishment in two facially different nations is so similar
despite differences in their history, constitutions, criminal law, governmen-
tal structures, and culture may suggest that it is possible to construct an
international standard governing the use of the death penalty worldwide.
A. History of the Use of Capital Punishment in India
As is the experience elsewhere in the world, the area today known as India
has used capital punishment throughout its recorded history.223 Although
Hindu law does not affirmatively advocate the use of the death penalty, 224
it does not reject its use. Furthermore, it justifies the use of capital punish-
ment for certain serious offenses against individuals and the state. 225
222. Hindu, Muslim, and British Law have all played significant roles in shaping the
current legal system in India. See GuIrA, supra note 28, at 17-25. However, despite this
history the Indian courts appear to look to the United States for guidance concerning the
constitutional limits on the use of capital punishment. For example, many of the Indian
death penalty cases cite cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. See infra notes 260-
66 and accompanying text. Thus, despite the fact that the Indian Constitution does not
include explicit protections against cruel and unusual punishment, the Indian courts
have limited the extent to which capital punishment may be legally employed. See infra
part III.C.
223. Gu'rA, supra note 28, at 17. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a
discussion of worldwide evidence of the acceptance and use of the death penalty.
224. Subhash Gupta, former Deputy Secretary of the Indian Red Cross Society in New
Delhi, explains that Hindu law traditionally governed the people of India. GuFTA, supra
note 28, at 17, 21. The Charter of Vishnusena was compiled in the 6th century A.D.
Unlike today, where religious law and the law of the government are distinct, religious
law dominated the affairs of Indian men and women. Id.
225. GurmA, supra note 28, at 20. The types of crimes for which Hindu law authorizes
the death penalty evolved throughout history. Id. at 18-21. In the feudal period, differ-
ent punishments were authorized depending on the caste of the offender. Id. at 20.
Although Hindu Law has dominated in much of India, Muslims ruled India from the
12th Century until the British took over in the late 18th Century. Id. at 22-23. See also
MODERN LEGAL SYsTms CycLoPEDIA, THE LEGAL SYsTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA, ch. 5,
9.80.9, § 1.2 (1990) [hereinafter LEGAL SYsTEm OF INDIA]. Muslim law has recognized
capital punishment throughout history. GuPTA, supra note 28, at 20. Subhash Gupta
explains that Muslim emperors who ruled India during the "Muslim [Mughal] times"
ensured that capital punishment was not accompanied by "mutilation or other cruelty."
Id. at 22. Capital sentencing under Muslim law is permitted in only three categories of
cases:
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 29
Under Hindu law, punishment is designed to eradicate evil, rather than to
inflict pain;226 consequently, death is not designed merely to serve retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes.227 Hindu law recognizes, however, that those
determining the appropriate sentence for a particular act must consider
both the objective circumstances of the offense and the subjective limita-
tion of the offender. 228 Despite its general acceptance as a morally viable
form of punishment, some Hindu rulers and members of the Hindu intelli-
gentsia have rejected the use of capital punishment.229
Although capital punishment was used in India prior to British rule,
the British were responsible for enacting "a systematized penal code which
strictly limited the number of capital offences and laid down the procedure
for criminal trials."230 This criminal code was not created in a single
effort. The British rulers crafted the code over nearly seventy years by mak-
ing gradual adjustments to the Muslim Criminal Law. The first alteration
occurred in 1793. The Bengal Resolution of 1793 dictated that the motives
or intentions of one found to have committed murder controlled whether
he might be subject to capital punishment.231 In addition, the victim's
(i) when the next of kin of a murdered person demands the life of the mur-
derer (qisas) and refuses to accept the alternative of money compensation (diya
or price of blood);
(ii) in certain cases of immorality; the woman owner is stoned to death in
public;
(iii) on highway robbers.
Id. at 23. Subhash Gupta indicates that Muslim law was significantly less barbarous
than the English law in force at the time. Id.
226. GuPTA, supra note 28, at 18.
227. Nevertheless, these and other "traditional" justifications for capital punishment
are advanced in India. See generally id. at 37-73.
228. Id. at 18-19. Subhash Gupta notes that these are the same considerations devel-
oped in many of the "most advanced systems of today." Id. at 19. The U.S. Supreme
Court has crafted these same safeguards in its current analysis of the Eighth Amend-
ment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment by requiring that state sentenc-
ing schemes strive for both consistency and individualized consideration. See supra part
II.B.3.
229. One Hindu prince explained:
Sometimes virtue assumes the form of sin and sin assumes the form of virtue. It
is not possible that the destruction of individuals can ever be virtuous ....
Without destroying the body of the offender, the King should punish him as
ordained by the scriptures. The King should not act otherwise, neglecting to
reflect upon the character of the offence and upon the science of morality. By
killing the wrongdoer, the King kills a large number of innocent men. Behold,
by killing a single robber, his wife, mother, father and children, all are killed.
When injured by wicked persons, the King should, therefore, think seriously on
the question of punishment, [sic] Sometimes a wicked person is seen to imbibe
good conduct from a pious man. It is seen that good children spring from
wicked persons. The wicked should not, therefore, be exterminated. The exter-
mination of the wicked is not in consonance with eternal law. By punishing
them gently, by depriving them of all their riches, by chains and imprisonment,
by disfiguring them, they may be made to expiate their offences.
GurA, supra note 28, at 21-2 (citing the study of Dr. P.K Sen).
230. Id. at 25. Subhash Gupta suggests that in creating a more systematic code, the
British were responsible for "partial abolition of capital punishment" in India. Id.
231. BENGcAL RESOLrnON 9, §§ 50, 52, 55, 76, (1793), substituted by Regulation 4,
1797, reprinted in GuPTA, supra note 28, at 23-24.
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next of kin lost the discretion to spare the murderer from capital punish-
ment.2 32 Other than this minor change, Muslim law continued to deter-
mine when capital punishment would be imposed. Starting in 1827, the
British began drafting more specific laws regulating the use of the death
penalty. The Bombay Regulation X of 1827 authorized the death penalty
as one of several available punishments2 33 for cases of murder where the
offender had "purposely, and without justifiable or extenuating cause,
deprive[d] a human being of life, or who... commit[ted] or assist[ed] in
any unlawful act, the perpetration of which is accompanied with the death
of human beings."234 The framers of this regulation stated that they were
"convinced that [the death penalty] ought to be very sparingly inflicted,
and [they] propose[d] to employ it only in cases where either murder or
the highest of the offences against the State has been committed."2 5 Fur-
ther drafts of this regulation and others dealing with the punishment for
criminal acts were developed during the following decades.3 6 Finally, on
October 6, 1860, the Governor-General of India signed the new Criminal
Code into law.2 7 Although the governing penal code during British rule
was amended periodically, the death penalty was retained until India
gained independence in 1947.238
In the years immediately following independence, the Government
retained the British policy on capital punishment, as the new Legislative
Assembly found it to be "an inopportune time for [its] abolition."2 9 In
1956, the Legislative Assembly began considering whether it should abol-
ish the death penalty. The federal government of India sought opinions on
the issue from all of its States and learned that all were vehemently
opposed to abolishing capital punishment.2 40 Despite this unanimous sen-
232. Id.
233. The other punishments included "transportation, imprisonment for life, or soli-
tary imprisonment with flogging." BOMBAY REGULATION XIV, § XXVI, ci. 4 (1827),
reprinted in GuPrA, supra note 28, at 24.
234. Id. at cl. 1.
235. Notes appended to the BOMBAY REGULATON XIV.
236. GuPTA, supra note 28, at 25.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 88. In 1946, one member of the Legislative Assembly stated that "the
Government does not think it wise to abolish capital punishment for any type of crime
for which that punishment is now provided." Id. (citing Legislative Assembly Debates,
Vol. IV, at 2770 (1946)).
239. Id. at 88.
240. Id. at 88-89. Like the United States, India's government is a republic, comprised
of 22 states and nine centrally administered territories. LEcAL SYSTEM OF INDIA, supra
note 225, at 9.80.16, § 1.3(A). The framers of the Indian Constitution believed that
federalism was the best solution to the potential problems of a "multi-racial, multi-lin-
gual, and multi-communal country ... with a vast area and huge population." Id. at
9.80.24, § 1.3 (B)(2)(e). The federal government is made up of three branches: the exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial. Id. Unlike the United States, the executive branch is not
separate from the legislature, because the President is responsible to the Legislature. Id.
Under the Indian Constitution, the federal judiciary is free from both legislative and
executive interference in order to ensure that the democratic freedoms guaranteed under
the Constitution remain meaningful. Id. at 9.80.24, § 1.3(B)(2)(c). As in the United
States, the states have the power to make laws and govern certain types of behavior. Id.
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timent, the Legislature considered and debated whether to abolish the
death penalty on three separate occasions from 1958 to 1962.241 After
conducting a thorough examination of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the Indian Penal Code, in September 1967 a special commission estab-
lished by the Ministry of Home Affairs submitted a special report on capital
punishment to the Government. This commission reported that after con-
sidering the many issues involved within the context of India's unique con-
ditions, the Government could not "risk the experiment of abolition of
capital punishment."242 Although the Penal Code has been amended such
that capital punishment is authorized for a more narrow class of
offenses,243 the death penalty has continued to be a commonly used
method of punishment in India.24 4
B. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
As in the United States, capital punishment in India has not been viewed as
per se unconstitutional. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, entitled "pro-
tection of life and personal liberty," states that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure estab-
lished by law."245 This provision by itself provides little guidance as to the
at 9.80.21, § 1.3(B)(2)(a). Nevertheless, the states are not entirely free in framing their
laws and policies. States must direct their policy towards securing:
(1) That the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate
means of livelihood;
(2) That the ownership and control of the material resources of the community
are to so be distributed as best to subserve the common good;
(3) That the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentra-
tion of wealth and the means of production to the common detriment;
(4) That there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
(5) That the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender
age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic
necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age and strength; and
(6) That childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against
moral and material abandonment.
Id. For a more general discussion of the political and governmental structure of India,
see generally ANIL CHANDRA BANERJEE, THE CONSTITrrIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA (1978);
DHaRM CHAND GuPrA, INDIAN GovmET AND PoLmcs (1978); J.C. JoHA~i, INDIAN
Gov A AND PoLarrcs (1974).
241. GuFrA, supra note 28, at 89-97.
242. -Id. at 97-98. This language is particularly interesting in light of Justice Black-
mun's language in Callins v. Collins. See supra note 130. For a more thorough discus-
sion of the commission's report and the recommendations made therein, see GuPrA,
supra note 28, at 97-101.
243. Id. at 102-07.
244. WHEN THE STATE KILLs, supra note 2, at 146-48. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, although some of the most influential figures in Indian politics in recent years,
such as Indira Gandhi, personally have favored abolishing the death penalty, the Gov-
ernment has not seriously considered its abolition. Id. at 148. There is no indication
that this attitude will change in the near future.
245. INDIA CONST. art. 21. The Indian Constitution is an amalgam of the constitutions
of the United States and Japan and the laws of the United Kingdom. GuPTA, supra note
28, at 191. Although the language guaranteeing fundamental rights has been borrowed
from the constitutions of different nations, Subhash Gupta emphasizes that these rights
are inalienable and indispensable, and thus are not created by any nation's constitution.
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legality of the death penalty in India. The language seems to suggest that
so long as a law provides for punishment by death, the death penalty is
lawful. The Indian Constitution has neither a due process clause nor an
article similar to that of the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment protect-
ing against cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, Article 72 of the
Indian Constitution bestows on India's President the power to grant par-
dons "in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death," as well as
among other cases.246 The Indian Supreme Court has indicated that the
language of both Articles 21 and 72 implies that the use of capital punish-
ment is constitutionally permissible if done according to a procedure
established by law.24 7 In Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the
Court stated that "[fin the face of these indications of constitutional postu-
lates it will be very difficult to hold that capital sentence was regarded per
se unreasonable or not in the public interest."24 8 Consistent with this pre-
diction, the Indian Supreme Court to date has not found the death penalty
to be per se unconstitutional.
Looking at the Constitution alone, the courts apparently have ample
opportunity to apply the death penalty without significant restrictions.
Surprisingly, however, even without explicit protection against cruel and
unusual punishment, the Indian Supreme Court has played an active role
in crafting limitations much like those applied in the United States. In
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,249 the Supreme Court explained that
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution could embrace the functions of the
U.S. Constitution's cruel and unusual clause and invalidate "what is puni-
tively outrageous, scandalizingly unusual or cruel and rehabilitatively
counter-productive." 250 Justice D.A. Desai explained that although there is
no provision like the Eighth Amendment in the Indian Constitution, the
Court "cannot be oblivious to the fact that the treatment of a human being.
which offends human dignity, imposes avoidable torture and reduces the
man to the level of a beast would certainly be arbitrary."25' The Court
agreed that Article 21 prohibited arbitrary procedures. Consequently, the
Court deemed such "punitively outrageous" schemes unconstitutional. 25 2
Id. British scholar David Pannick noted that Article 21 is similar to the due process
clauses of the U.S. Constitution. DAVID PANNIcK, JuDIcIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY
29 (1982). As with the due process clauses, Article 21 requires that the law be "right,
just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive." Id. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi
Administration, Justice Desai wrote that it is "[t]rue [that the Indian] Constitution has no
'due process' clause or the [Eighth] Amendment... but in this branch of the law [i.e.:
criminal justice] ... the consequence is the same." AIR 1978 S.C. 1675, 1690. Thus,
according to Pannick, the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted criminal law so that
due process is implied in both procedural and substantive senses. PANmcu, supra, at 29.
246. INDIA CONST. art. 72.
247. Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 S.C. 947, 952.
248. Id.
249. Sunil Batra, AIR 1978 S.C. 1675.
250. Id. at 1690.
251. Id. at 1735. In India, the Federal Legislature plays a far more influential role in
this process than does the U.S. Congress since India has a separate Penal Code unlike
the United States. See INDIA PEN. CODE (XLV of 1860).
252. Sunil Batra, AIR 1978 S.C. at 1719-20.
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Thus, perhaps due to the Indian Supreme Court's use of the United States
as a model, explicit protections against cruel and unusual punishment are
not necessary in order to invoke judicial review of Indian sentencing
schemes. 253
C. Discretion in Death Sentencing
Much like in the United States, both the Indian Legislature and Supreme
Court have crafted guidelines specifying the degree of discretion a sen-
tencer may exercise.254 For example, the Indian Supreme Court has indi-
cated that mandatory capital sentencing is unconstitutional in most
situations.255 However, it has rejected arguments on the constitutionality
of the death penalty which are analogous to the plurality's decisions in
Furman v. Georgia.256 The Indian Court shares the belief that arbitrarily
imposed death penalties are unconstitutional, yet it has "doubted the wis-
253. According to David Pannick:
[t]he American and Indian judiciary have expressed a surprising degree of una-
nimity as to the circumstances in which and the reasons why the death penalty
is, on occasions, unconstitutional .... The death penalty is a denial of the rule
of law where:
(1) It is imposed in a cruel and painful manner;, or
(2) It is wantonly and freakishly imposed; or
(3) It is mandatory for a defined offence; or
(4) It is grossly disproportionate to the offence; or
(5) It is otherwise based on caprice or procedural irregularity.
PAN-ICK, supra note 245, at 65.
254. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code designates that judges shall determine the
sentence. IrDmA PEN. CODE § 302; see also GuTA, supra note 28, at 191. The Criminal
Procedure Code requires that after an individual has been convicted for a capital crime,
there must be a sentencing hearing where the judge hears evidence and considers any
"special reasons" which might indicate that death is the appropriate punishment. The
hearing also serves to provide the legal framework relevant for the application of the
death sentence. INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 235(2); see also GuirA, supra note 28, at 113-
14.
255. Guprm, supra note 28, at 200. In Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 S.C. 473,
Justice Chandrachud stated:
The scales of justice are removed from the hands of the Judge so soon as he
pronounces the accused guilty of the offence. So final, so irrevocable and so
irrestitutable [sic] is the sentence of death that no law which provides for it
without involvement of the judicial mind can be said to be fair, just and reason-
able. Such a law must necessarily be stigmatised [sic] as arbitrary and
oppressive.
Id. See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. The Indian Penal Code explicitly
provides that a judge has the discretion to sentence eligible criminals either to death or
life imprisonment. GuTrA, supra note 28, at 199.
256. PANNiCK, supra note 245, at 104. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980
S.C. 898, the Indian Supreme Court explained that:
The view taken by the plurality in Furman v. Georgia... to the effect, that a law
which gives uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the Jury (or the Judge) to
choose arbitrarily between a sentence of death and imprisonment for a capital
offence, violates the Eighth Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do not
have in our Constitution any provision like the Eighth Amendment, nor are we
at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness .... There are grave doubts about
the expediency of transplanting western experience in our country. Social con-
ditions are different and so also the general intellectual level. Arguments which
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dom and the possibility of achieving total control of such discretion
through legislative guidelines."257 In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, the
Indian Supreme Court explained that "[t]he impossibility of laying down
standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India
which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing
the degree of punishment." 258 Towards the end of their opinion, the Court
criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Gregg v. Georgia and its
companion cases,259 explaining that:
[Ilt is neither practicable nor desirable to imprison the sentencing discretion
of a judge or jury in the strait-jacket of exhaustive and rigid standards. Nev-
ertheless, these decisions do show that it is not impossible to lay down
broad guidelines as distinguished from ironcased standards, which will min-
imise [sic] the risk of arbitrary imposition of death penalty for murder and
some other offences under the Penal Code.260
Despite its rhetoric against rigid standards, the discretion afforded to
Indian judges is not without restrictions.
The Indian judiciary is not alone in rejecting the impulse to codify in
rigid guidelines what its judges may and may not consider when sentenc-
ing eligible criminals. In fact, the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment26 1  considered the merits of codification of "the various
considerations which weigh or should weigh with the court in the exercise
of discretion" 262 long before the U.S. federal government began to place
restrictions on capital sentencing. 263 After careful study, the Royal Com-
mission concluded that it is both difficult and dangerous to attempt to enu-
merate the circumstances that judge's should not take into account in
capital sentencing, the circumstances judges should take into account only
in relation to other circumstances, and the circumstances judges may con-
sider independently.264 The Commission explained that:
the exercise of the discretion may depend on local conditions, future devel-
opments, evolution of the moral sense of the community, state of crime at a
particular time or place and many other unforseeable [sic] features ....
[C]odification of these considerations may ... be too wide and too narrow
at the same time. 265
would be valid in respect of one area of the world may not hold good in respect
of another area.
Id.
257. PAMmCK, supra note 245, at 104.
258. Bachan Singh, AIR 1980 S.C. 898, 935.
259. Woodson v. North Carolina was one of the other cases decided with Gregg. See
supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
260. Bachan Singh, AIR 1980 S.C. 898, 942.
261. The newly independent Indian government created the Commission in 1949.
GuPrA, supra note 28, at 16.
262. Id. at 201.
263. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia began influencing state
capital sentencing procedures. See supra part I.B.1. The U.S. Congress never has
passed legislation designed to regulate state sentencing procedures.
264. GuwrA, supra note 28, at 201 (citing the Report of the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment (1949-53), Cmd. 8932, 193 para. 629-31).
265. Id.
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The three branches of the Indian federal government continually have cau-
tioned against rigidly guided discretion, particularly after witnessing the
U.S. Supreme Court's efforts to construct a workable system. 26 6
In rather lengthy dicta, the Court in Bachan Singh suggested ways in
which the courts might channel sentencer discretion. Rather than attempt-
ing to formulate "exhaustive standards," the Court repeatedly admonished
judges to look at each case as an individual unit.2 67 More specifically, the
Court explained that "simply in terms of blameworthiness or desert crimi-
nal cases are different from one another in ways that legislatures cannot
anticipate."26 8 In addition, the Court cautioned that "a standardization of
the sentencing process which leaves little room for judicial discretion to
take account of variations in culpability within single-offence [sic] category
ceases to be judicial. It tends to sacrifice justice at the altar of blind uni-
formity."26 9 As a suggestion of how the judiciary might best channel dis-
cretion, the Court cites lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
that can be found in many U.S. state penal statutes.2 70
Despite its lengthy admonitions and suggestions, the Court recognized
that it is not authorized to establish rules. Rather it is the legislature's role
to establish guidelines governing acts of the judiciary.2 7 ' The Court recog-
nized the importance of separation of powers and acknowledged that one
of the most significant duties of the judiciary is to identify the areas of law
which are handled more appropriately by the more representative
branches of government. 27 2 Specifically, the majority opinion stated:
As Judges, we have to resist the temptation to substitute our own value
choices for the will of the people. Since substituted judicial 'made-to-order'
standards, howsoever painstakingly made, do not bear the people's impri-
matur, they may not have the same authenticity and efficacy as the silent
zones and green belts designedly marked out and left open by Parliament in
its legislative planning for fair-play of judicial discretion to take care of the
variable, unpredictable circumstances of the individual cases, relevant to
individualised [sic] sentencing.2 73
Thus, except for truly flagrant inconsistency or arbitrariness in the exercise
of discretion or where it can be found that the death penalty is freakishly
imposed,274 the Indian legislature has ultimate control over the degree of
discretion allowed.
The Indian Penal Code does provide for a mandatory death penalty in
cases where a convicted offender already serving a sentence of life impris-
onment commits murder.2 75 As the aforementioned cases demonstrate,
266. Id. at 201-02.
267. Bachan Sing, AIR 1980 S.C. 898.
268. Id. at 937.
269. Id. at 938.
270. Id. at 943-44.
271. Id. at 938.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. PANNcy,, supra note 245, at 104.
275. Id. at 111-12.
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the Indian Supreme Court seems to share the view of the U.S. Supreme
Court that mandatory death penalties are unconstitutional in any circum-
stance despite this statute. The Indian Supreme Court has not explicitly
condemned mandatory capital sentencing, but dicta in many of its death
penalty decisions strongly suggests that the constitutionality of the death
penalty is contingent upon the "valuable safeguards of the life and liberty
of the subjects in the cases of capital sentences."276 These decisions
demonstrate that the Indian Supreme Court has construed the Constitu-
tion to permit capital punishment only in those situations where the crime
is exceptionally despicable and the mitigating factors do not support a case
for leniency. There is no room for mandatory death penalties under such a
philosophy.
As in the United States, the Indian judiciary and legal establishment
has been reluctant to create a system in which discretion is completely
unguided. Subhash Gupta explains that "[it is clear from the study of the
decisions of the higher courts on the life-or-death choice that judicial adho-
cism or judicial impressionism dominates the sentencing exercise and the
infliction of death penalty suffers from the vice of arbitrariness [and]
caprice."277 Judges are not immune from the influence of their own "phi-
losophies of law and life."2 78 The risk of arbitrariness may be even greater
in a system where the ultimate discretion in sentencing is left to a single
individual after a person has been convicted of a capital crime. At least in
theory, having a jury make this determination will have the effect of balanc-
ing the many personal philosophies involved, thereby fostering a more
judicious result. In addition, as India is comprised of people of different
races, religions, and socio-economic classes, there is a profound risk of
unequal application of the death penalty.279 Justice Krishna lyer poetically
wrote:
Who, by and large, are the men whom the gallows swallow? The white col-
lar criminals and the corporate criminals whose willful economic and envi-
ronmental crimes inflict mass deaths or who hire assassins and murder by
remote control ... [r]arely [face this fate]. The feuding villager heady with
country liquor, the striking workers desperate with defeat, the political dis-
senter and sacrificing liberator intent on changing the social order from
satanic misrule, the waifs and strays whom society has hardened by neglect
276. Id. at 113. For example, in Bachan Singh, the Court stresses that
[t]he normal rule is that the offence [sic] of murder shall be punished with the
sentence of life imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and impose
the sentence of death only if there are special reasons for doing so .... While
considering the question of sentence.., the Court must have regard to every
relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as the criminal. If the court
finds, but not otherwise, that the offence [sic] is of an exceptionally depraved and
heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and the manner of its
execution, a source of grave danger to the society at large, the court may impose
the death sentence.
Bachan Singh, AIR 1980 S.C. 898, 936 (emphasis added).
277. GuIrA, supra note 28, at 203.
278. Id. at 202.
279. Unequal application of the death penalty has been a controversial issue in the
United States as well. See supra note 138.
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into street toughs, or the poor house-holder-husband or wife-driven by dire
necessity or burst of tantrums-it is this person who is the morning meal of
the macabre executioner.2 80
Consequently, just as the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. state legislatures
have attempted to create guidelines which are thorough, workable, and fair,
the Indian judiciary and legislature have constructed guiding principles to
help judges produce consistent and fair sentencing determinations.
The Indian Government has followed the example of a majority of
American states and has constructed lists of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which judges are required to consider.281 Unlike the sen-
tencing statutes in the American states authorizing capital punishment,
neither the Indian Penal Code nor the Indian Criminal Procedure Code
explicitly list the factors which judges must consider. However, these fac-
tors have been listed in many Indian Supreme Court decisions as well as
unofficial compilations of Indian law. 282 The Indian judiciary and legal
establishment appears to be in a dilemma because although the Court
believes that the Legislature is the appropriate body to enact sentencing
guidelines,28 3 the Legislature is unwilling to codify any rigid rules that will
impede individualized consideration. 28 4 Until one of these objectives
gains prominence, unofficial rules and the piecemeal guidance contained
in Supreme Court decisions will be the only guidance provided to Indian
judges.
D. Executive Clemency in India
Article 72 of the Indian Constitution explicitly bestows on the President
the power to grant pardons "in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of
280. Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 S.C. 916, 936.
281. GuPrA, supra note 28, at 122-23. The aggravating factors include:
(1) The manner in which the offence is perpetrated: whether it be by forcible or
fraudulent means, or by aid of accomplices;
(2) The malicious motive by which the offender was actuated;
(3) The consequences to the public or to individual sufferers; and
(4) The special necessity which exists in particular cases for counteracting the
temptation to offend, arising from the degree of expected gratification, or the
facility of the perpetration peculiar to the case.
Id. The mitigating factors include:
(1) The minority of the offender;
(2) The old age of the offender,
(3) The condition of the offender, e.g., wife, apprentice;
(4) The order of a superior military officer,
(5) Provocation;
(6) When the offense was committed under a combination of circumstances
and influence of motives which are not likely to recur either with respect to the
offender or to any other;
(7) The state of health and the sex of the delinquent.
Id. For a more detailed explanation of the particular significance of many of the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, see id. at 144-84.
282. Id. at 122. One of these unofficial sources is RATAN LAL, LAw oF CRaIMs (1987).
283. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
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death,"285 yet it says nothing about how this power is to be exercised. The
Indian Supreme Court has indicated that the President has complete dis-
cretion and the courts shall not interfere with his actual decision on the
merits.286 As is the case with U.S. state governors, the President of India
typically exercises his power to grant clemency on the advice of his cabi-
net.28 7 Although the language of the Constitution suggests that the Presi-
dent's discretion in granting clemency is unfettered, the Indian Supreme
Court has a limited power of judicial review. This power ensures that the
President considers all relevant materials before reaching a decision. For
example, in Harbans Singh v. State of U.P.,28 8 the Indian Supreme Court
exercised its power of judicial review in a case where the President granted
a pardon for one perpetrator of a crime yet failed to grant a pardon for the
prisoner's accomplice after having reviewed both petitions carefully. The
President commuted the first prisoner's sentence to life imprisonment and
approved the second prisoner's death sentence. The Court was hesitant to
interfere with an explicit exercise of executive authority and indicated that
"in the interest of comity between the powers of the Supreme Court and
[those] of the President of India, it [would] be more [fitting] if the Court
were to recommend that the President of India may be so good as to exer-
cise his power under Art. 72 of the Constitution."289 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court used its power of judicial review to commute the death
sentence to life imprisonment. 290 Justice A. N. Sen's concurring opinion
further explained that
[i]t would be a sheer travesty of justice.., if for the very same offence, the
petitioner has to swing and pay the extreme penalty of death whereas the
death sentence imposed on his co-accused for the very same offence is com-
muted .... Very wide powers have been conferred on the Supreme Court for
due and proper administration of justice... [including] an inherent power
and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation in the larger
interests of administration of justice and prevention of manifest injustice
291
Thus, the President's discretion over when a prisoner's sentence will be
commuted from death to life imprisonment is limited by the Indian Consti-
tution to such extent that manifest injustice may not result from the denial
of a prisoner's petition.
The Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure also
authorize clemency in capital cases. Section 54 of the Penal Code provides
285. INDIA CONST. art. 72. Article 161 gives the governors of each state the power to
grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment for crimes over which the
executive power of the state extends. Id. at 161.
286. CONSTITUIONS OF THE CouTmES OF TH WOtLD 88-89 (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONSTITUTONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD].
287. Id. at 89-90.
288. AIR 1982 S.C. 849.
289. Id. at 850.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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that, "[i]n every case in which the sentence of death shall have been passed,
the appropriate Government may, without the consent of the offenders,
commute the punishment for any other punishment provided by this
Code."2 92 The Indian Legislature has not qualified this power, leaving the
reasons for commutation solely to the Presidrnt or Governor's judg-
ment.293 Although the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a signifi-
cantly more detailed description of executive clemency power, the
executive's discretion remains virtually unlimited. 294
The President is entitled to reject a petition for clemency without hear-
ing the petitioner present his argument. The Constitution says nothing
about the procedure by which the President makes his decisions; thus, the
Supreme Court cannot require that each petitioner be given audience.295
In exercising his authority to grant or deny pardons, the President is
entitled to examine any evidence de novo.2 96 When he does consider the
evidence afresh, the President is treated as independent from the judiciary.
Consequently, he may grant relief if he finds that a mistake was made in
the trial or at any other time in the trial process. 297 This power is different
than merely having the ability to hear newly acquired evidence. In effect,
the President acts as a final forum for appeal where the normal procedural
rules are no longer binding.
E. Summary of Discretion in the Use of Capital Punishment in India
Even though India has a dramatically different history than that of the
United States and it is comprised of vastly different cultures and traditions,
the discretion in capital sentencing in India is remarkably similar to that in
the United States. Although Indian judges generally have sole discretion
once a person has been convicted of a capital crime, the Indian legal sys-
tem has constructed nearly the same guidelines and precautionary meas-
ures designed to ensure that the death penalty is employed as fairly and
consistently as possible. The similarity is not completely surprising given
that the drafters of the Indian Constitution and Justices on the Indian
Supreme Court relied on U.S. laws as models.298 The fact that India looks
to the U.S. "experiment"299 with capital punishment for guidance suggests
292. INDIA PEN. CODE § 54; GuPTA, supra note 28, at 126-27.
293. Gu'rA, supra note 28, at 126-27.
294. INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 432-33. See GuirA, supra note 28, at 128-31.
295. CONsrrru-nONS OF THE CouNTnuas OF THE Womi,, supra note 286, at 89.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. It is possible that India would have used the United Kingdom as a model if the
latter had continued to use capital punishment for more than extraordinary crimes.
However, when India gained its independence, those who structured the new govern-
ment opted for a federal republic, much like the United States. LEGAL SYSTEM OF INDIA,
supra note 225, at §§ 9.80.16-9.80.24.
299. The word "experiment" has been used in both the United States and India to
describe the use of capital punishment. Justice Blackmun described the use of the death
penalty as an experiment in his opinion in Callins v. Collins. 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129-38
(1994). His use of the term was clearly intended to be negative. See supra note 130. In
contrast, the 1967 Indian special conIission used the word "experiment" to describe the
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that if the United States were to join the growing international abolitionist
movement, India might be willing to follow its lead.
Nevertheless, because there is no indication that capital punishment
will be abolished in India in the near future, it is imperative that both the
Indian Supreme Court and the Legislature continue their efforts to con-
struct a death sentencing structure that is as fair and consistent as possi-
ble. They must continually analyze whether death penalties are imposed
arbitrarily. Finally, they must continue to study other nations' experiences
with capital sentencing and not just the U.S. experience in order to under-
stand the inherent limitations in capital sentencing and help them con-
struct the most judicious system.
IV. Discretion in the Philippines30 °
The situation in the Philippines contrasts sharply with that in both the
United States and India. Although it is the only country of the three which
has explicitly abolished capital punishment in its Constitution, the current
Philippine government expressly supports the use of the death penalty.
Unlike both the United States and India, Philippine authorizing legislation
allows for mandatory death sentencing. The modem Philippine experience
with the death penalty suggests that so long as political situations around
the world remain volatile it may be unwise to trust the statistics which
suggest a worldwide trend towards the abolition of capital punishment.
The Philippine experience also may suggest that it will never be possible to
reach an international consensus concerning the domestic use of capital
punishment.
A. Political History of the Philippines
Like both the United States and India, the current Philippine governmental
system is a republic.30 1 This form of government is relatively new, as it was
possibility of abolishing capital punishment. GurrA, supra note 28, at 97-98. In this
context, the absence of capital punishment was clearly intended to be a negative. See
supra note 245 and accompanying text.
300. The Philippines is a particularly valuable country to study for several reasons.
First, the status of the legality and the use of capital punishment in the Philippines has
been uncertain in recent years. Although in the mid-1980s it appeared as if the
Philippines was becoming an abolitionist nation, since Fidel Ramos came to power the
death penalty has returned and has been authorized for crimes that many consistently
retentionist nations refuse to authorize. See generally, WHEN THE STATE K-is, supra note
2, at 191-92. Because the legal status of capital punishment has been so uncertain in
Philippines, this Note does not analyze the Philippines in the same way as it analyzes the
United States and India. Rather, the Philippine experience is used to demonstrate how
some nations are moving in the opposite direction, instituting more rigid death penalty
legislation despite the international trend towards limiting and even eliminating capital
punishment.
301. MODnRN LEcAL SYsTEms CYcLoPEDmL, THE LEcAL SYsrEm oF TE PHnippNEs, ch.
7(b), 9.290.5, § 1.2 (1990). [hereinafter LEGAL SYSTEm oF THE PriaLPPnEs]. However,
although it is a republic, the Philippines has a federal penal code. Id. Thus, unlike the
United States where the individual states have some degree of discretion over defining
and prosecuting particular crimes, in the Philippines, all crimes are federal. Id.
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formed following the ouster of the Japanese occupation at the close of
World War 11.302 Prior to 1946, the legal history of the Philippines was
determined by successive periods of foreign domination. In 1521, Ferdi-
nand Magellan came to the Philippines and claimed the islands as new
Spanish territories. 303 The Spanish brought with them royal and civil laws
which governed the Philippines until 1898.304 Although an independent
Philippine republic governed briefly in 1898, the Spanish ceded the Philip-
pines to the United States at the close of the Spanish-American War.30 5
The U.S. government completely redrafted the laws governing the Philip-
pines to make them consistent with the U.S. Constitution and American
principles.30 6 The United States authorized the Philippines to create its
own Constitution and elect its own leaders, which it did in 1935.307 The
U.S. government indicated it would grant the Philippines independence
only after a Commonwealth government successfully governed for ten
years. 3°S The Philippine Commonwealth was interrupted by the Japanese
occupation from 1941-1944;309 however, on July 4, 1946, the Philippines
finally became completely free from foreign domination.310
The new government's first order of business was rehabilitating the
economic condition of the Philippines and restoring peace and order.311
During this period, the government continued to use the U.S.-inspired
302. Id. at 9.290.5, 9.290.7. The Japanese invaded the Philippines during World War
II and imposed military rule over the islands for three years. Id. Although in their final
year of occupation the Japanese attempted to create a Philippine republic, following the
war the Filipino people rejected this government and opted to build their own republic.
Id.
303. Id. at 9.290.6. Before the Spanish occupation, the Filipino people lived in
numerous independent communities, or barangay. Id. at 9.290.5. The only laws in
existence were customary and unwritten. These laws governed the areas of family rela-
tions, inheritance, divorce, usury, partnerships, loans, property rights, barter and sale,
and crime and punishment. Id. at 9.290.5.
304. Id. at 9.290.6. The Spanish extended their laws to the Philippines either by royal
decrees or by enacting special laws for the islands. Id. By the time of the Philippine
Revolution (1898), several codes and special laws were in force. These laws include the
1870 Penal Code, the 1872 Code of Criminal Procedure, the 1856 Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the 1886 Code of Commerce, the 1870 Marriage Law, the 1861 Mortgage Law, the
1859 Mining Law, the 1866 Law of Waters, the 1879 Copyright Law, the 1877 Railway
Law, the 1870 Law of Foreigners for Ultramarine Provinces, and the Code of Military
Justice. M. GAisoA, AN ImrRoDUcrnON TO PnLppiN'E LAw 69-71 (7th ed., 1969).
305. LEGAL SYsTmE OF rE Prnppnqs, supra note 301, at 9.290.6.
306. Id.
307. Id. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt approved and signed the first Phil-
ippine Constitution on February 8, 1935, and the citizens of the Philippines ratified it
through a plebiscite on March 14, 1934. Id. at 9.290.6-.7. Soon thereafter the citizens
elected their first President and Vice-President. Id. at 9.290.6.
308. Id. at 9.290.6.
309. Id. at 9.290.7. During World War II, the exiled Commonwealth continued to
function in Washington, D.C. and on February 28, 1945, it was re-established in the
Philippines. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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1935 Constitution.3 12 In 1967, the Philippine Congress authorized the for-
mation of a constitutional convention to redraft the Constitution to better
suit the needs and goals of the Filipino people.3 13 After years of work, a
new Constitution was drafted and ultimately ratified by the Filipino citi-
zens in 1973. Although this was the nation's first independently drafted
constitution, it failed to protect individual citizens' essential civil and polit-
ical rights explicitly. This omission enabled Ferdinand Marcos to establish
a dictatorship which consistently denied citizens fundamental civil
rights.3 14
In 1986, the Philippines underwent a "non-violent revolution" which
ousted President Marcos and installed President Corazon Aquino. 3 15
Upon assuming 'office, Corazon Aquino immediately began to work
towards restoring civil rights and promoting human rights in the Philip-
pines.3 16 One of the most significant actions of the Aquino government
was the drafting of a new Constitution designed to afford Filipino citizens
greater protection of civil and political rights. This new Constitution
included a comprehensive Bill of Rights which explicitly and specifically
recognizes the rights of all Filipino citizens. 3 17 In addition to rights similar
to those granted in the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Philippine Bill of Rights con-
tains: a separate due process clause for criminal prosecutions;3 18 the guar-
antee that no person shall be detained solely by reason of political beliefs
and aspirations;3 19 the protection from torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any means which vitiate free will; and the prohibition of
secret, solitary, incommunicado, or similar forms of detention.3 20 Although
the Philippine equivalent to the U.S. prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishments more significantly defines prisoners' rights, it leaves to the legis-
312. Id. Thus, the government was divided into three branches: the executive branch,
headed by the President, the legislative branch, constituting a bicameral Congress, and
the judiciary branch, headed by a Supreme Court and a series of inferior courts. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. This Note does not examine the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. For pur-
poses of this Note, it is important to understand that the harshness of the Marcos regime
combined with the non-violent Philippine Revolution of 1986 led to the more progres-
sive and liberal Aquino presidency. For a more thorough discussion of the rise and fall
of President Ferdinand Marcos, see RE ECrIoNS ON MAgRTAL LAW AND THE MARcos Dic-
TATORSHIP (Senate of the Philippines eds., 1989); DicrAToRsun' & REvOLtnON: ROOTS OF
PEOPIX'S PoWER (AuroraJavate-de Dios et al. eds., 1988);JIM FOREsr, FouR DAYS iN FEBRU-
ARY: THE STORY OF Tm NoNVIOLEmN OVERTHROW OF THE MARcOS REGIME (1988); SrouNG
SEAGRAvE, THE MARcos DYNAmSY (1988); RoscA NnNOTcHKA, ENDGAMEG THE FALL OF
MAxcos (1987); JOHN LYONS, MARCOS AND BEYOND: THE PHILIPPINES REVOLUTION (1987).
315. See generally FoREsT, supra note 314.
316. AmNEsTY INTERNATiONAL, PimLippNEs: THm KILLING GoEs ON 87 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter THE KYLLING GoEs ON].
317. PHL.- CONST. art. Ill. This Bill of Rights is significantly more specific and
detailed than the U.S. Bill of Rights and is comprised of 22 sections. The drafters of the
new Philippine Constitution probably recognized that, given the power President
Marcos had been able to wield, civil and political rights had to be explicitly defined so as
to give future presidents less room to deny political and civil rights.
318. Id. § 14(1).
319. Id. § 18(1).
320. Id. § 12(2).
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lature determination of remedies. 321
The new Bill of Rights dearly demonstrates the Philippines' primary
objective of protecting individual rights from future attack As part of its
efforts to afford greater protections of individual life and liberty, the draft-
ers of the new Constitution included explicit provisions abolishing the
death penalty, a punishment which had been used during the Marcos
regime.322 In addition to drafting a new Constitution, Aquino released
political prisoners, repealed repressive decrees which had allowed indefi-
nite detention of citizens accused without trial, and restored the right of
habeas corpus.323
In 1992, Fidel Ramos, former Chief of Staff of the Armed forces, was
elected President of the Philippines. Throughout Aquino's presidency,
Ramos had been an ardent supporter of the reintroduction of the death
penalty for particular crimes.324 Once he became president, one of his
primary objectives was to reinstate the death penalty for particularly "hei-
nous" crimes.325 To achieve this goal, Ramos did not seek to change the
1987 Constitution and the democratic government thereunder, rather he
worked within the current system by manipulating the flexible language of
the Constitution. 326 Thus, although the current Philippine Constitution
and political structure is the most liberal in its history and most explicitly
protects civil and political rights, the government is structured such that a
President with a "crime-busting" and a military agenda has been able to
provide for capital punishment for more crimes than were authorized
under Marcos' martial law.3 27
321. Id. § 19(2). This section states that "[t]he employment of physical, psychologi-
cal, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard
or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law."
Id.
322. WHEN THE STATE KuLLs, supra note 2, at 191. See infra part IV.B.
323. THE KnILING GoEs ON, supra note 316, at 87.
324. WHEN THE STATE KULS, supra note 2, at 191.
325. 13 Crimes Listed Under Death Penalty, T-E MAxJ A BuLLEN USA, Dec. 2-8, 1993,
at 1. Due to the consistently high crime rate in the Philippines, Ramos, a graduate of the
United States Military Academy, believed that the death penalty was necessary to reduce
crime. He had been elected on a law and order platform and made it clear that, if
elected, he would work towards the passage of a new death penalty law as a deterrent to
violent crimes. Philippines Restores Death Penalty for Heinous Crimes, JAPAN EcoN. NEw-
swmnu, Dec. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News Service File.
More specifically, at the time the Philippine Congress enacted the new death penalty
legislation, the Philippines had the highest murder rate in Asia. Alex Dacanay, Philip-
pines Restores Capital Punishment, THE Nmm WKLY., Dec. 13, 1993, at 27. In addition,
kidnapping had become an overwhelming problem as kidnapping syndicates targeted
Chinese businessmen. Philippines; Reviving Death, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 33.
This problem is believed to have caused foreign investors to shun the Philippines, which
in turn had drastic effects on the Philippine economy. Id. From March 1992 to August
1993, 191 wealthy Chinese-Filipinos were abducted by "kidnap gangs." Philippines
Restores Capital Punishment, supra. Neighboring countries, such as Singapore, also had
been pressuring the Philippine government to reintroduce the death penalty for drug-
related crimes, as they were concerned that the softer Philippine penal regime
encouraged the growth of the drug trade in the area. Id.
326. See infra part IV.B.
327. Philippines; Reviving Death, supra note 325, at 33.
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B. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Only a few years ago, the Philippines was among those countries advocat-
ing abolition of the death penalty.3 28 The revised Bill of Rights in the 1987
Constitution 32 9 had abolished the use of the death penalty for all but "com-
pelling reasons involving heinous crimes, [where] the Congress hereafter
provides for it."3 30 The Philippine Congress subsequently revised the Phil-
ippine Penal Code to incorporate this new Constitutional standard. The
Congress redrafted every article in the Code which authorized sentences of
death for particular crimes such that life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua, was the most stringent penalty available.3 3 1 The Code repeat-
edly instructs that the death penalty has been abolished and that all provi-
sions relating to the death penalty have been superseded.33 2
In addition to abolishing the death penalty until such a time that the
Congress passed valid legislation, the Constitution reduced all existing
death sentences to life imprisonment.33 3 When the new Constitution
became effective in 1987, there were over 500 condemned prisoners, most
of whom had been sentenced by military tribunals during President
Marcos' most intense period of martial law (from 1972-1981).334 In her
first year as president, Aquino commuted the sentences of many of these
prisoners; however, in January 1988, 360 prisoners still were under a sen-
tence of death. The Philippine Department of Justice explained that the
commutations could not go into effect without an official act of Con-
gress.33 5 Nevertheless, none of these prisoners were executed for their
crimes.3 36
In 1989, the Philippine Supreme Court considered the effect of the
constitutional abolition of capital punishment. In People v. Munoz,3 37 three
men, employed as bodyguards of a mayor, were found guilty of the murder
328. WHEN TE STATE KILLs, supra note 2, at 191.
329. Id. See supra notes 313-20 and accompanying text.
330. PHu CONsT. art. III, § 19.
331. See PHIL. Ray. PENAL CODE, Title 3 (Penalties), arts. 25-88 (1991). See infra note
333 for a more thorough explanation of the punishment of reclusion perpetua.
332. PHEL. REv. PENAL CODE, Title 3 (Penalties), arts. 25-88 (1991).
333. PHIL. CONSr. art. III, § 19. Life-imprisonment in the Philippines is known as
reclusion perpetua. Despite the title of the punishment, those who are convicted and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua are only required to spend 30 years in prison, after
which they are granted a pardon, unless they have engaged in extremely poor conduct
during their imprisonment. PHIL. REv. PENAL CODE, art. 27. Reclusion perpetua includes
additional punitive measures which last beyond the period of imprisonment. For exam-
ple, people who receive this sentence are banned from holding any public office and
employment which the offender may have held prior to their incarceration, even if con-
ferred by popular election, and are deprived of the right to vote or be elected to any
public office. Id. arts. 30-33. During the period of imprisonment, the offender is
deprived of the rights of parental authority, of guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the rights to manage his property, and of
the rights to dispose of such property by any act or any inter vivos conveyance. Id. art.
34.
334. WHEN THE STATE KLus, supra note 2, at 191.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 170 SCRA 107 (1989).
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of three people whom the bodyguards had suspected were cattle rustlers.
The authorized penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code ranged from the minimum punishment of reclusion temporal, impos-
ing a prison sentence of twelve years and one day to twenty years,338 to the
maximum punishment of death.339 The issue before the Court was the
appropriate punishment for the crime, given that the abolition of capital
punishment eliminated the current maximum sentencing option.340 The
Court found that Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution did not dis-
rupt irreparably the existing sentencing scale authorized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code.34 ' The maximum penalty merely had been
changed from death to reclusion perpetua.342 In four prior cases, the Court
had required that penalty scales affected by the abolition of the death pen-
alty had to be divided into three new periods in order to ensure consistent
sentencing.343
Nevertheless, in Munoz the Court rejected this active interference in an
area more appropriate for legislative determination. The Court noted that
it has no authority to modify penalties or redraft their range, and that if the
Congress wished to change sentencing guidelines, it must do so itself.3 4
4
Thus, the Munoz case demonstrates that the Court fully embraced the abo-
lition of capital punishment, and that the abolition did not require a full-
scale overhaul of the penal code. The courts thereafter would use the
existing sentencing guidelines, merely disregarding death as an option.
Because the drafters of the new Constitution dealt separately with cap-
ital punishment, the Philippine Supreme Court did not develop a separate
body of law limiting its use under the due process clause or prohibition
against excessive punishments. Such jurisprudence was unnecessary so
long as the Philippine Congress opted not to exercise its power of reinstat-
ing capital punishment for cases involving heinous crimes.345 However,
once the Congress decided to reintroduce the death penalty for particularly
heinous crimes, section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights no longer applied and
the lack of Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting capital sentencing
allowed the Congress to enact relatively strict legislation.346 More specifi-
cally, because the Supreme Court had not yet been asked to consider the
constitutionality of either mandatory death sentencing or sentencing
schemes which gave sentencers unlimited discretion under the due process
338. PHu. REy. PENAL CODE, art. 27.
339. Id. art. 248.
340. Munoz, 170 SCRA at 107.
341. Id. at 113.
342. Id. at 107.
343. People v. Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327 (1987); People v. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113
(1987); People v. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242 (1987); People v. Intino, 165 SCRA 635
(1988).
344. See Vincente V. Mendoza, The Constitution According to the Supreme Court: A
Review of Cases in 1989-1990, 64 PHiL. UJ. 66 (1989).
345. Recall that section 19(1) abolishes capital punishment except in those cases
where the Congress provides for its use "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." PHIL. CONsr. art. III, § 19 (1).
346. See infra part IV.C.
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clause or specific protections against extreme punishment,34 7 the Con-
gress has had unbridled discretion in drafting its new legislation.
In August 1987, General Fidel Ramos, then Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces, now President of the Republic of the Philippines, urged Congress to
reintroduce the death penalty for rebellion, murder, and drug-traffick-
ing.3 48 In December 1993, after more than a year of debate, the Philippine
Congress enacted legislation that categorizes thirteen crimes as heinous
offenses punishable by death, in accordance with the Constitution.
34 9
President Ramos explained that the nation "cannot stop violence and hei-
nous crimes by simply trying to humanize criminals."35 0 He further
explained that "[i]n re-examining this provision of our constitution, we do
not reject its spirit .... We only say that there are now compelling reasons
for restoring capital punishment with respect to crimes which our people
and our government consider so heinous or so inhuman that the ultimate
penalty must be imposed."351 The designated crimes include: treason,
piracy and mutiny on the high seas, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnap-
ping for ransom and illegal detention, robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape where the victim is a minor
or the perpetrator has AIDS, drug trafficking or other drug-related crimes,
auto theft with attendant homicide, plunder of government funds worth at
least fifty million pesos (approximately $1.8 million),3 52 and bribery
involving law enforcement officers.35 3 This legislation did not merely
authorize the use of capital punishment for these crimes; it had the much
more dramatic effect of establishing mandatory death sentencing for cer-
tain offenses.35 4 President Ramos signed the bill into law and it went into
347. In the United States these cases include Furman v. Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia,
Woodson v. North Carolina, and Lockett v. Ohio. See supra part IL.B. In India these cases
include Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Sumil Batra v. Delhi Administration,
Mithu v. State of Punjab, Bacham Singh v. State of Punjab, see supra parts IILB and III.C.
There are no analogous cases in the Philippines at present.
348. WHEN THE STATE KiLts, supra note 2, at 191.
349. REnr'Llc Acr No. 7659, Dec. 13, 1993. 13 Crimes Listed Under Death Penalty,
supra note 325. The bill passed by a vote of 123-26 in the House of Representatives, and
9-6 (with one abstention) in the Senate. Philippine Congress Approves Death Penalty,
REuTEs, Dec. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News Service File.
350. President Ramos Signs Death Penalty Act into Law After Six Years' Abolition, BBC
NEws, Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News Service File.
Ramos justified this act based on the penological principle of future crime deterrence
and on economic grounds, expressing grave concern over the flight of foreign invest-
ments due to the high crime rate. Id.
351. Ramos Signs Law Restoring Death Penalty, AGENcE FRANcE PREsSE, Dec. 13, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News Service File.
352. This provision was included in direct response to the allegations of massive theft
of public money by President Marcos and his wife Imelda during Marcos' 20 years in
power. Philippine Congress Approves Death Penalty, supra note 349. The Marcos' and
their business allies have been accused of stealing up to $20 billion from the Philippine
treasury. Id.
353. REPUBLIC AcT No. 7659, supra note 349. See also 13 Cases Listed Under Death
Penalty, supra note 325; President Ramos Signs Death Penalty Act into Law After Six Years'
Abolition, supra note 350; Ramos Signs Law Restoring Death Penalty, supra note 351.
354. See infra part IV.C.
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effect on January 1, 1994.3 55
Although the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines explicitly rejects the
use of capital punishment except for those cases in which the Congress
expressly authorizes its use due to the relative heinousness or atrocious-
ness of the crime, it can be argued that the language used was merely
aspirational. 356 The drafters of the Constitution made it relatively easy for
Congress to reinstate the death penalty whenever it opted to do so.
Because "heinous" was not specifically defined in the Constitution, section
19(1) conferred considerable discretion on the Congress in drafting its
death penalty legislation. This discretion, coupled with the absence of sep-
arate death penalty jurisprudence, has caused the Philippines to transform
itself from being one of the most progressive nations in the world in terms
of explicitly rejecting the death penalty in its constitution into a firm advo-
cate of the unhindered use of capital punishment.
C. Discretion in Death Sentencing
Due to the unusual recent history of capital punishment in the Philippines,
the Philippine Congress currently is able to determine which groups or
individuals will have discretion in death sentencing and what degree of
discretion shall be allowed. Until the Philippine Supreme Court is able to
consider particular cases which have been brought to it on constitutional
grounds, the Congress will continue to have ultimate discretion over the
bounds of the death penalty's legality.35 7 Ironically, it seems as if the deci-
sion to address capital punishment explicitly in the Bill of Rights without
completely abolishing its use interfered with the development of Supreme
Court case law delineating the death penalty's constitutional limits under
broader constitutional principles. Thus, the drafters' decision to abolish
the death penalty, while also granting the Congress broad powers to restore
it, has enabled a new president to reintroduce the use of capital punish-
ment for more crimes than were ever "death eligible" during the Marcos
regime.358
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about sentencing discretion
in Philippine death penalty cases, given that its Congress only recently has
reintroduced capital punishment and that, therefore, this area of the law is
presently undeveloped and particularly volatile. It is unclear whether the
Supreme Court will limit the use of the death penalty based on other Bill of
Rights protections. Perhaps the Philippine Supreme Court will follow the
lead of either the U.S. Supreme Court or the Indian Supreme Court and
355. Death Penalty Returns to the Philippines, RauTres, Dec. 31, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News Service File.
356. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
357. Once a constitutional challenge is brought against a death sentence, the
Supreme Court will be able to start developing its own death penalty jurisprudence,
much like the Supreme Courts have done in the United States and India. Capital
defendants might bring challenges under section 19(2) of the Bill of Rights, the rough
equivalent to the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment, or under the due process
clause.
358. Philippines; Reviving Death, supra note 325.
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will develop case law which allows sentencer discretion, yet at the same
time channels it in order to achieve consistent sentencing and prevent arbi-
trariness. On the other hand, the Philippine Supreme Court may adopt
Justice Scalia's view that individualized sentencing and guided discretion
are inherently incompatible and consequently may find mandatory sen-
tencing to be constitutionally permissible. 359 Perhaps the Filipino citizens
will decide that capital punishment does not attain its intended objectives
and will urge their legislators to repeal the legislation or even pass a consti-
tutional amendment totally abolishing the death penalty. Given its rela-
tively brief history of independent, representative government and its even
briefer history of using capital punishment under such a political struc-
ture, Philippine history provides little guidance as to the potential future of
capital sentencing discretion in the Philippines.
D. Summary of Discretion in the Use of Capital Punishment in the
Philippines
Currently, death sentences are being imposed aggressively in the Philip-
pines as part of President Fidel Ramos' campaign against violent crime and
against continued flight of foreign investment.360 Thus far, the Philippine
Congress has unbridled discretion in crafting its death penalty legislation.
As a result, the death penalty currently is authorized for a relatively broad
array of offenses and in several cases death sentencing is mandatory once
an individual has been convicted of such crimes. The constitutional aboli-
tion of the death penalty resulted in the eventual pardoning of approxi-
mately 500 prisoners who had been sentenced to death by Marcos' military
tribunals and six years free from additional capital sentencing. However,
the abolition ultimately proved to be mainly aspirational because the Phil-
ippine Congress was able to reverse the seemingly abolitionist trend and
reinstate capital punishment with a vigor which never existed during Presi-
dent Marcos' dictatorship.
At present, it is unclear what role capital punishment will play in the
future of Philippine criminal law. Whatever the future may bring, the Phil-
ippine experience may suggest that, contrary to Professor Schabas' hypoth-
esis,361 there is no worldwide trend towards absolute abolition of capital
punishment. Even those nations which have abolished the death penalty
already may revert to using it if the political climate changes or crime rates
begin to rise uncontrollably. This theory is most plausible in countries like
the Philippines, which do not have a long history of independent demo-
cratic rule. In addition, the Philippine experience may suggest that there is
little hope in constructing a single international standard governing the
continued use of capital punishment. Individual nations have strong ideas
about what works best for their "unique" circumstances. They do not
appreciate foreign governments or international organizations dictating
359. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
360. As of publication, no prisoner has been executed in the Philippines. See AmNsrY
INERNATIONAL, supra note 14, at 4.
361. See supra note 29.
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how their criminal justice systems should be structured. Thus, perhaps the
most valuable lesson that can be taken from comparing to other nations
the legality and use of capital punishment in the Philippines is that general
rules cannot be generated by such a comparative study.
Conclusion
Comparing the degree of discretion permitted and exercised in retentionist
nations around world teaches valuable lessons about both the current use
of capital punishment in the United States and the future use of capital
punishment throughout the world. Although the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to treat sentencing discretion as an area constrained by the
Eighth, Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments has forced states to provide sig-
nificant protections against arbitrariness in their capital sentencing
schemes, many nations which share the same views on important rights of
humanity, particularly the European nations, consistently and unifiedly
have favored total abolition of capital punishment. What makes the United
States different from its European allies? Why is it that India, a nation
which has fewer constitutional protections than the United States, has
developed virtually the same death penalty jurisprudence as exists in the
United States? Because the United States has not experienced the same
degree of political and civil instability experienced by most of the other
staunch retentionist nations, it is difficult to understand why the death
penalty is not only being retained in the United States, but is being used
more widely and more aggressively.
Even if there are no clear explanations as to why the United States has
thus far rejected the death penalty jurisprudence of its traditional allies, a
study of the legality and use of capital punishment throughout the world
reinforces the U.S. Supreme Court's objective of developing a capital sen-
tencing system which allows some degree of sentencing discretion channel-
ling, to guarantee consistency and fairness. India, a nation with a
dramatically different political history, culture, and religious background,
also has recognized that, given the finality of death sentences, it is essential
to protect against arbitrariness. Although the Philippine legislature cur-
rently allows for mandatory death sentencing, which completely rejects
individualized sentencing, it is likely that this legislation will be challenged
in the near future. The volatile nature of the Philippine legal and political
system makes the Philippines an interesting case .study and an important
country to watch; however, it currently is not an appropriate model for
capital sentencing jurisprudence.
This comparative study indicates that the future of worldwide use of
capital punishment is uncertain and unpredictable. Although Professor
Schabas offers plausible evidence that there is a gradual abolitionist trend,
most nations which continue to retain the death penalty have made no
indications that they are even considering absolute abolition. Even those
nations which have already abolished capital punishment, particularly
those which lack a tradition of political and civil stability, should be
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watched closely. The failure of the United Nations to reach a consensus in
favor of advocating an aspirational goal of total abolition of capital punish-
ment by the year 2000 most clearly demonstrates that it is at best optimis-
tic to believe that worldwide abolition is likely to become a reality in the
near future. Nevertheless, opponents of the death penalty should not aban-
don their cause. Consistent opposition to capital punishment will keep the
abolitionist dialogue open and will continue to ensure that the most fair
and consistent sentencing structures will be enacted. So long as the dia-
logue remains open, ultimate abolition will remain a possible outcome of
the international experience with capital punishment.

